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PAOLO SILVESTRI
THE IDEAL OF GOOD GOVERNMENT IN LUIGI EINAUDI’S
THOUGHT AND LIFE: BETWEEN LAW AND FREEDOM*
PROLOGUE
There has been no authentic liberal thinker insensible of the problem con-
stituted by the relation between freedom and law. It is a problem that can be
stated, in a nutshell, as the need to avoid two the extremes of law without
freedom or freedom without law, that is to say, either absolute power or ab-
solute anarchy, the extreme of law that shackles, confines or paternalistically
guides freedom, or the extreme of absolute freedom that destroys its own con-
ditions of possibility. However, it is important to avoid the temptation of con-
figuring the two extremes in dichotomic, oppositional and static terms, as if
the problem were Freedom versus Law. This would invite a twofold risk:
on the one hand, that of configuring the law consistently and exclusively as
a coercive act, which thus inevitably coerces freedom, and on the other hand,
the risk of failing to grasp that the real problem is obedience to the law – but
an obedience by virtue of which the law is not perceived as coercive, and is
felt instead as an obligation complied with by free consent. In this perspective,
the problem of human freedom appears not only as a problem of freedom un-
der the law, but also as an appeal for ‘‘freedom from the law’’. It is an appeal to
* This article is a translated, modified and expanded version of ‘‘Legge e Liberta`. Cinque var-
iazioni attraverso la vita e il pensiero di Luigi Einaudi’’, Biblioteca della liberta`, XLIV, n. 195 (May-
August 2009), pp. 1-31 (English revision by Rachel Barritt Costa). It has also been used and deliv-
ered as the basis of my ‘‘Luigi Einaudi public lecture’’, The Dream of Good Government (April 26,
2011), held at the Cornell Institute for European Studies (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY) as Luigi
Einaudi Chair Holder. I’m particularly grateful to those who helped me to make this little ‘‘American
dream’’ come true and gave me one more chance to do further lectures and debate about my re-
search, as well as to those who gave me a very warm welcome: Luigi R. Einaudi, the San Giacomo
Charitable Foundation, Sydney van Morgan, Sidney and Susan Tarrow, Christopher Anderson,
Holly Case, Camille Robcis, Mabel Berezin, Karen Pinkus, Timothy Campbell, Annalise Riles, Jo-
nathan Kirshner, Gail Holst-Warhaft, Kora Ba¨ttig von Wittelsbach, Cindy K. Greco.
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supersede, to go beyond the ‘‘Law’’ (tradition, authority, a scientific para-
digm, custom and even the constitutional order), should the law be felt as
no longer just and/or justifiable, i.e. no longer legitimate. Yet precisely be-
cause an appeal of this nature emerges from the concrete experience of life,
it is never foreseeable a priori.
I will argue here that Einaudi’s thought reveals an awareness – albeit
never made sufficiently explicit in philosophical terms – that the question
of freedom has to do with two inter-related problems: the relation of indivi-
duals or communities with their respective limits – of which Lex, Auctoritas
and Veritas are emblematic figures – and the question of going beyond these
limits. Limits are to be understood here in the meaning of the foundation or
conditions of possibility both of institutions (economic, political and juridical)
and of thought and human action. The concept of law I will try to put forward
thus does not refer to the version given by legal positivism. Indeed, such a
version would have been precluded within the worldview embraced by Einau-
di, steeped as he was in the English tradition. Rather, ‘‘Law’’ should be inter-
preted here – in a broader sense and bearing in mind the necessarily ambiva-
lent relation it holds with freedom – as a figure of the limit.1
It is certainly no coincidence that on the one and only occasion where Ei-
naudi ventures a definition of liberalism, he terms it a ‘‘doctrine of limits’’.2 It
is likewise no coincidence that he never defines freedom, either analytically or
conceptually.3 Fully aware that the problem of freedom is the eternal quandary
1 In this paper I refer in particular to the problem of the limit as discussed by P. LEGENDRE,
Della societa` come testo. Lineamenti di un’antropologia dogmatica (2001), Ital. transl., P. HERITIER
(ed.) (Torino, Giappichelli, 2005); P. HERITIER, ‘‘Introduzione’’, ibid., pp. 1-31; ID., ‘‘Urbe-internet’’,
vol. 2, Societa` post-hitleriane? Materiali didattici di estetica giuridica (Torino, Giappichelli, 2007). On
Legendre’s thought cf. also L. AVITABILE, La filosofia del diritto in Pierre Legendre (Torino, Giappi-
chelli, 2004); A. SUPIOT, Homo juridicus. Saggio sulla funzione antropologica del diritto, Ital. transl.
(Milano, Mondadori, 2006). On the question of the limit, see the fundamental work by P. NERHOT,
La metafora del passaggio. Il concetto di tempo in S. Agostino. Fondamento di una nuova etica (Pado-
va, Cedam, 2008). Cf., from various different perspectives, P. HERITIER, ‘‘Uscire dal secondo millen-
nio? Problemi metodologici nel discorso sulla liberta`’’, in ID. (ed.), Problemi di liberta` nella societa`
complessa e nel cristianesimo (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008), pp. 39-104; B. MONTANARI, ‘‘Li-
berta`, responsabilita`, legge’’, in ID. (ed.), Luoghi della filosofia del diritto. Un manuale (Torino, Giap-
pichelli, 2009), pp. 27-63.
2 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Liberalismo’’ (1944), in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia, 1943-1947,
P. SODDU (ed.) (Florence, Leo Olschki, 2001), pp. 65-66.
3 Though the Two Concepts of liberty analysed by Berlin (see I. BERLIN, ‘‘Two Concepts of Lib-
erty’’ (1958), in ID., Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118-172)
both exist in Einaudi’s speculation, in my judgment, Einaudi’s above mentioned sentence evokes an
idea of liberty which cannot easily be conceptualized as ‘‘autonomy’’, or ‘‘absence of coercion’’.
Though this liberty is difficult to define, it differs from the previous ones because it takes into ac-
count the dimension of time, which is the proper dimension of man, and seems to be connected
to that ‘‘man’s look addressed toward the new and the high’’, which I will dwell on later. I discussed
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of mankind, Einaudi sounded a warning, precisely when the first distinctions
between liberalism and ‘‘neo’’ or ‘‘new liberalism’’ were being drawn. He
cautioned that
liberalism is one and one alone and it endures over time; but each generation has to
solve its own problems, which are different from those of yesterday and will be super-
seded and renewed by tomorrow’s problems. Therefore even liberals must at all times
ask themselves the following searching question: how should I solve the problems of
my own day, in such a manner that the solution adopted serves to safeguard the su-
preme good that is the freedom of man?.4
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Einaudi sets his portrayal of the human
appeal for freedom within a context that invokes the emergence of the ‘‘new’’.
Even more significant is the fact that he formulates this demand more in me-
taphorical than in categorial terms, as when he writes ‘‘[to] constantly break
down the frontier of the known, of previous experience, and move towards
the unknown that is still open to the material and moral advancement of
man’’.5 That Einaudi did indeed have profound insight into the above-de-
scribed complexity of freedom emerges first and foremost from the emphasis
he places, in each of the spheres of human and social activity (in primis, the
economic, political and juridical sphere), on leaving open the possibility of
change. The same perceptive awareness was expressed elsewhere by Einaudi
as an anti-reductionist aspiration, or better, as the need for man and society to
retain a line of communication open to a ‘qualitative’ level of discourse that
would integrate the purely ‘quantitative’ level. In Einaudi’s words, which
we will dwell on again later: a progression from the rationality of interests
to shared values (so that, in the ‘‘divine city’’, ‘‘the word ‘tax’ shall be un-
known’’, since ‘‘all people know the underlying reason and the value of the
sacrifice offered on the altar of common good’’); from ‘‘compromise’’ as a uti-
litarian exchange (do ut des or ‘‘pure self-seeking and biased calculation’’) to
compromise seen as ‘‘loyal allegiance’’ (or ‘‘overcoming opposites and mer-
ging them into a higher unity’’); from the rationality of procedures (the ma-
jority criterion of the ‘‘major pars’’) to the identity-based recognition of the
‘‘sanior pars’’; from the mere legality of the law (which ‘‘is always formally
the Einaudian conception of freedom with A. Giordano (in a review of his book Il pensiero po-
litico di Luigi Einaudi, Genova, Name, 2006): P. SILVESTRI, ‘‘On Einaudi’s liberal heritage’’, History
of Economic Ideas, XVI, nn. 1-2 (2008), pp. 245-252; A. GIORDANO, ‘‘A Short Reply’’, ibid.,
pp. 253-255.
4 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Il nuovo liberalismo’’ (1945), in Riflessioni cit., p. 119.
5 ID., ‘‘In lode del profitto’’ (1956), in Prediche inutili (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1956-1959), p. 192.
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coercive’’) to its full legitimacy (by virtue of which ‘‘the people say: this is the
law – and abide it’’); finally, almost as if to slow down the race to reduce eco-
nomic activity to the rational-calculating aspect, Einaudi stressed the anthro-
pological dynamics of desire. For if on the one hand ‘‘the fundamental eco-
nomic principle was and will forever be the limitedness of means suitable
to achieve the numerous and ever-changing and constantly proliferating goals
men set themselves’’, on the other he placed emphasis not so much on rational
calculation of the means but on the overwhelming force of desire, which con-
tinually rewrites the limits of the human:
Even though technical and scientific advances daily push back [...] the obstacle
of the limitedness of means which thwarts satisfaction of human desires [...], man’s
desires race faster than does science [...] In fact, if man’s gaze were not directed to-
wards the new, and upwards, then how would humans be distinguished from animal
species?6
I will thus try to propose a possible re-interpretation of some key passages
of the Einaudian discourse which appear to represent crisis or turning points
and yet, at the very same time, act as signals of a process of growth and ma-
turation of his thought that ceased only with his death. These were passages
that were constantly being written and rewritten, through that interweaving of
life and thought, experience and reflection which was constitutive of Einaudi
the man. Unceasingly spurred by the great changes and the dramatic, often
tragic, events of his era, he was compelled to reformulate over and over again
the statement of his guiding principles, the laws of his thought. These pas-
sages from the life and thought of Einaudi are therefore important inasmuch
as they highlight a theme that proves recurrent, yet is never identical to itself:
the Law-Freedom relation. In accordance with the logic of variations on a
theme, I will develop this relationship through five emblematic figures.
1. IN PARTICULAR: ‘‘RULES OF THE GAME’’ AND ‘‘STRUGGLE’’
As I have tried to show elsewhere, Einaudi’s liberalism cannot be adequately
understood other than by tracing it back to his prolonged and uncon-
cluded search for good government.7 Despite the innumerable interpretations
6 ID., Scienza economica ed economisti nel momento presente (Torino, Tip. Artigianelli, 1950),
p. 23; English transl.: ‘‘Economic science and economists at the present days’’, International Social
Science Bulletin, II, 2 (1950), pp. 160-171.
7 Here I take up again and develop several themes and conclusions I put forward in the book Il
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Western political thought has given of good government – a veritable mythic
symbol that has constantly risen again to new birth during the history of over
two millennia,8 – in its broader sense it has maintained the general meaning of
the ideal model of society or also called the good society or good polity.9 This
was not, however, a model that Einaudi regarded as an ideal representation of
the perfect society: rather, a perfectible model (as we will see more clearly in
the conclusions – section 5 – but it is helpful to underscore this aspect from
the very start in order to avert any misunderstandings concerning the sup-
posed impossibility of reconciling liberalism and good government).10 Turn-
ing his attention again to this mythic symbolization, and refreshing it in the
light of his own day, Einaudi began to refer to good government, often in
an allusive manner, above all when his intellectual efforts concentrated on
the attempt to reconstruct the liberal institutions destroyed first by the war
and then by fascism.
The ideal model of the liberal society that formed the object of Einaudi’s
quest consists of two essential moments, which represent the two moments of
the ‘‘struggle’’, or, as it were, the two foci of good government: competition
and debate, or more generally, the market and the public sphere,11 which he
liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del buongoverno (Soveria Mannelli, Rubettino, 2008). On Einaudi,
Bobbio wrote: ‘‘no-one uses the words good government and bad government any longer, and any-
one who does still use them seems to be looking to the past, a distant past, which only a composer of
useless preachings has the courage to bring up again any more’’. Now, while noting that the antith-
esis ‘‘good government and bad government’’ is ‘‘one of the great themes, if not the greatest of all
themes in political reflection of all times, Bobbio reductively construed Einaudian good government
as government by good rulers (specifically, he referred to the figure of Cavour as an Einaudian ex-
emplum of a good ruler). For a construal of Einaudian good government in terms of a theory of
greatest collective welfare: F. FORTE, Luigi Einaudi: il mercato e il buongoverno (Torino, G. Einaudi,
1982). Ro¨pke alluded to the ‘‘vast programme of ‘good government’ to which Einaudi devoted his
whole life’’, with a reference to the problem of the relation between political-legal institutions and
the market: W. RO¨PKE, ‘‘La lezione di Luigi Einaudi’’, in A. DALLE MOLLE (ed.), Il maestro dell’eco-
nomia di domani (s.l., Edizioni di via aperta, 1961), p. 30 (my italics).
8 Cf., among others, N. BOBBIO, ‘‘Il buongoverno’’, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, vol. VIII, 5
(1983), pp. 235-244; Q. SKINNER, Visions of Politics, vol. II, Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002). In this important works there is a lack of reference to the reception-
translation, by Italian humanism, of the theme of good government in oikonomia treatises, and today
this still leads to misinterpretations (see infra, notes and text).
9 For a reappraisal of this issue see the essays in A. HAMLIM – P. PETTIT (eds.), The Good Polity.
Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989).
10 A misunderstanding often due to interpretation of ‘‘good government’’ in terms of Greek
political philosophy or of republicanism; cf. for ex. A. PASSERIN D’ENTRE`VES, La dottrina dello Stato.
Elementi di analisi e di interpretazione, second edition (Torino, Giappichelli, 1967), p. 321; Engl.
Transl. The Notion of the State. An Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon press,
1969). For a re-reading of the theme of good government in a liberal-democratic perspective see
C. DONOLO, Il sogno del buon governo. Apologia del regime democratico (Milano, Anabasi, 2002).
11 Bruno Leoni already perceived in Einaudian thought the existence of a ‘‘parallelism of the
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perceived as embodying the principle of material and intellectual progress. If
competition is conceived as a mechanism for selection of the deserving and
for ushering in the better and the new, by the same token debate acts as a
principle that operates with a view to establishing truth. What they share is
the necessary condition of struggle, that is to say, variety and diversity (of ac-
tions and opinions): in a nutshell, pluralism. Aware that World War I, the red
two-year period and, later, fascism that had become a regime, had to a large
extent undermined the foundations of the old liberal order, eroding it slowly
at first, but then at an ever increasing pace, Einaudi initially sought to mount a
staunch defense of the old system.12 In the article Verso la citta` divina [To-
wards the Divine City] (1920), written in that context of social unrest from
which fascism drew its lifeblood, Einaudi wrote a critical reply, underpinned
by his liberal convictions, to an article by Giuseppe Rensi. The latter had spo-
ken of a ‘‘genuine hymn to the force that unifies, that kills doubt and marks
the way’’ and had urged intervention by an authoritarian power capable of re-
establishing order. After recognizing that ‘‘his hymn responds to a need of the
human spirit that is loath to engage in conflict, or in the struggles of men, par-
ties, ideas, and desires instead to seek peace, harmony and concord, the unity
of spirits, even if obtained by means of the sword and blood’’, Einaudi
responded with a spirited counter-proposal, outlining the presuppositions
of the ‘‘divine city’’, i.e. his ideal conception of the rule of law, built up
around the polarity between the fecundity of struggle and a necessary
framework of rules.
If I could, I would like to write as impetuous and captivating a hymn as his, a
hymn to discord, struggle, disunity of spirits [...] What on earth reason is there for
the state to have its own ideal of life, and then be compelled to force men to conform
with it, a` la Napoleon? Why only one religion rather than many different kinds? Why
only one political, social or spiritual point of view and not an infinity of opinions?
Beauty, perfection, cannot be equated with uniformity, nor with unity: the essence
resides in variety and contrast.13
economic order and the political order’’, suggesting that it includes ‘‘another pair of reciprocally cor-
responding concepts: the market on the one hand, debate on the other’’, B. LEONI, Luigi Einaudi e la
scienza del governo (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1964), p. 21.
12 For an analysis of this dramatic phase of Einaudi’s speculation see M.L. SALVADORI, ‘‘Einau-
di e la sua concezione del conflitto sociale’’, Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, XXXVII (2003),
pp. 7-31.
13 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Verso la citta` divina’’ (1920), in Il buongoverno. Saggi di economia e politica (1897-
1954), E. ROSSI (ed.) (Bari, Laterza, 1954), pp. 32-33. Note the similarity between the passages taken
from Einaudi mentioned in the text and the Popperian praise of the tower of Babel: K.R. POPPER,
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But variety and contrast are to be found only within that which Einaudi,
in this very first allusion to the ‘‘divine city’’, terms the ‘‘limit state’’ (see sec-
tion 3.2).
The vision of the fecundity of struggle can be traced back to the anthro-
pological core of Einaudi’s liberalism (his ‘‘generative ideas’’), as set forth
most explicitly in La bellezza della lotta [The Beauty of Struggle] (1923).
Against any imposition from on high, or even worse, against any surrepti-
tiously paternalistic attempt, whether brought about at the hand of whichever
petty politician happens to wield power at the time, or espoused by socialism
or the rising growing corporative doctrine, Einaudi re-affirms the value of the
‘‘efforts of those who desire to elevate themselves on their own and in this
struggle, fight, falter and rise again, learning at their own expense how to
win and to better themselves’’.14 It is by no means superfluous to point out
that at the origin of the Einaudian conception of struggle and freedom there
lay anti-perfectist Christian anthropology: man as a flawed and fallible being,
not perfect, yet perfectible.15 Although Einaudi refers only occasionally to this
background,16 it remains as the underlying setting of many of his statements
on the fallibility of knowledge and human action. It is a setting Einaudi would
draw on more than once when re-reading the works of some English thinkers
who, while not necessarily Christian, were considered by Einaudi to be among
the ‘‘founders’’ and/or advocates of the exercise of criticism in the public
sphere: Milton, Junius,17 Mill, Dicey, Bryce.
Congetture e confutazioni (1969), G. PANCALDI (ed.), it. transl. (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1972), p. 598;
also by K.R. POPPER, Alla ricerca di un mondo migliore. Conferenze e saggi di trent’anni di attivita`,
it. transl., B. DI NOI (ed.) (Roma, Armando, 1989), p. 213. For a recent re-reading of these themes:
E. DI NUOSCIO – P. HERITIER, ‘‘Le culture a Babele: scacco od opportunita`?’’, in E. DI NUOSCIO –
P. HERITIER (eds.), Le culture di Babele. Saggi di antropologia filosofico-giuridica (Milano, Medusa,
2008), pp. 7-15.
14 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘The Beauty of the Struggle’’ (1923), in ID., Selected Economic Essays, L. EINAU-
DI, R. FAUCCI and R. MARCHIONATTI (eds.) (NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 66-72, 66.
15 On the possible configurations of the relation between Christianity and liberalism, cf. the
essays contained in P. HERITIER (ed.), Problemi di liberta` nella societa` complessa e nel cristianesimo cit.,
especially P. NEMO, Quattro tesi sul tema dei rapporti tra liberalismo e cristianesimo, ibid., pp. 129-
161; most recently, D. ANTISERI – G. GIORELLO, Liberta`. Un manifesto per credenti e non credenti,
Afterword by S. Tagliagambe (Milano, Bompiani, 2008).
16 See L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Perche´ la guerra continua’’ (1920), in Cronache economiche e politiche di un
trentennio (1893-1925), 8 volumes (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1961-1966) [henceforth Cronache], vol. V,
1963, pp. 967-977, where Einaudi contrasts two conceptions of man and, consequently, of society,
namely the perfectist vision of ‘‘reasoning reason’’ which seeks to ‘‘create the state and society by
starting out from the premise of naturally good mankind perverted by political institutions’’, versus
the ‘‘Roman, Christian, British view of the real man, a mixture of virtues and vices, reason and pas-
sion, of historical man as he has evolved over the millennia, as he is molded by the land, the institu-
tions of the past, of previous generations’’.
17 It is worth recalling that Einaudi himself worked under the pseudonym of Junius, especially
6
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After levelling harsh charges against The silence of the industrialists18 fol-
lowing the assassination of Matteotti, Einaudi reluctantly had to recognize
that the exercise of criticism had been relinquished in the wake of this event
that was to signal the turning-point towards dictatorship. Yet at least at the
beginning, Einaudi was of the opinion that only a tiny minority had effectively
forsaken their critical voice; he remained confident that in the overwhelming
majority of cases, the power of criticism would prevail.
One year before his forcible resignation from the ‘‘Corriere della Sera’’,
followed by the expulsion of its Director, his friend Albertini, Einaudi again
staunchly defended the liberal position, issuing one of his last warnings to the
Italians in the Preface (1925) to Mill’s On Liberty. Mill’s work, he wrote, was
being brought out in its Italian version ‘‘at a moment when it is vitally urgent
that the right of criticism and of non conformism, and all the issues involved
in the struggle against uniformity, should come to the fore and be given pride
of place. Precisely because fascism had begun to shackle the press and the
country was bit by bit being ‘‘driven towards intolerance’’, Einaudi believed
it was necessary to reiterate loud and clear the ‘‘immortal principles’’ pro-
claimed by Mill: ‘‘truth can become a principle of action only when all people
are allowed the broadest possible freedom to contradict it and confute it [...]
Truth, once it has become a dogma, no longer exerts its effectiveness in im-
proving men’s character and behavior’’.19 Further expanding on the teachings
of Mill, Einaudi realized, as he wrote years later in a preface to the writings of
Albertini, that fascism was supported by mass consensus; therefore the real
and ‘‘undying problem’’ of freedom is that of ‘‘defending the freedom of
the minority against the tyranny of the majority’’.20
After the old liberal order had been definitively swept away, and Einaudi
had retired from public life to devote himself to study, he focused his intel-
lectual efforts on the attempt to re-found the liberal order by molding it on
a framework of widely shared (liberal) values that would be catalyzed by
the ideal of good government. In effect, it had been the very circumstance
of the broad-ranging popular support achieved by fascism that had led him
in his most polemical articles, some of which he then gathered together in Lettere politiche di Junius
(Bari, Laterza, 1920), thereby evoking the celebrated Letters of Junius, considered as the ‘‘trailblazer
of the modern press’’: J. HABERMAS, Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica (1962), it. transl. (Bari, La-
terza, 1971), pp. 78-79.
18 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Il silenzio degli industriali’’ (1924), Cronache cit., vol. VII, 1965, pp. 767-768.
19 ID., Prefazione to J.S. MILL, La liberta` (Torino, Piero Gobetti editore, 1925), p. 4.
20 L. EINAUDI, Prefazione to L. ALBERTINI, In difesa della liberta`. Discorsi e scritti (Milano - Ro-
ma, Rizzoli, 1947), p. XV.
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to realize (as will be seen further on, in section 2 concerning his exchange of
ideas with his pupils) that the struggles of the red two-year period were not
merely fomented by struggles among different interests, but were struggles
for the recognition of axiological goals the liberal regime had failed to grasp.
In his attempt to gain insight into the causes of the disintegration of the social
fabric, the route Einaudi would follow was that of re-reading the past in order
to re-found the future liberal institutions. Thus as he reflected on one of the
crucial points that engaged his thoughts, and calling to mind the ethos and
modus agendi of those who made up the middle class, Einaudi dwelt on what
in his view had constituted a favorable circumstance:
The classes genuinely representative of Italy, composed of small and medium-
sized industrialists, landowners, tenant farmers, merchants and craftsmen, all of them
very hard-working, as well as [...] honest upright professional figures and civil ser-
vants devoted to the public good, still supplied the state with a fair number of
men who went into politics and held government office. Righteous and hard-working,
they deemed that the most consummate art of statesmanship lay in ensuring ‘good
government’ of public affairs, where ‘good government’ was to be understood as that
wise and prudent manner of administrating which they adopted in private affairs.21
The scope and significance of this passage can best be understood by as-
sociating it with another work by Einaudi, a profoundly autobiographical
work, in which Einaudi re-evokes the ethos and narrates the events and under-
takings of his family, especially his mother and his uncle (he was extremely
attached to his uncle, whom he had ‘‘worshipped like a second father’’): ‘‘this
manner of living that I used to observe in the family home represented the
universal habits of the Piedmontese bourgeoisie for the greater part of the
19th century’’. These habits shaped ‘‘a ruling class that left a profound imprint
of honesty, capabilities, parsimony, devotion to duty in the political and ad-
ministrative life of the Piedmont which subsequently created Italy itself’’.
At that time, Einaudi continued,
man, the family, were not conceived in isolation from their rootedness in the land, the
home, the local area, and these are sentiments that also engender devotion to the
country and the spirit of sacrifice which, alone, are capable of nurturing the young
shoots that will burgeon into sound states.22
21 L. EINAUDI, La condotta economica e gli effetti sociali della guerra italiana (Bari, Laterza,
1933), p. 400.
22 ID., ‘‘Avvertenza del compilatore’’ (1922), in Pagine doglianesi, 1893-1943 (Comune di Do-
gliani - Biblioteca civica Luigi Einaudi, Dogliani, 1988), pp. 32-34. On the relevance of this essay see
M. EINAUDI, Presentazione, ibid., pp. 11-12.
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Reading between the lines of these two citations, a synthesis of some of
the most recurrent problems of political, juridical and economic philosophy
can be perceived: the problem of order, legitimacy and obligation; the ques-
tion of the ruling class and of those holding power in government, and the
question of the relation between private and public, and between society in
general and the government as well as that between the market and the state;
and, last but not least, the problem of individual, family, affective and social
relations, the question of values, traditions and the civic virtues on which
every social order is built (in dwelling on these issues Einaudi mentions spe-
cific aspects such as prudence, parsimony, a hard-working approach, honesty,
a professional attitude, loyalty, trust, spirit of sacrifice). The veritable conun-
drum of these issues was to become the crux of Einaudian research on liberal
good government.23
Now, as far as our analysis is concerned, it is significant that these problems
are evoked through a latent analogy between government of one’s
own home and civil government. Although the Einaudian approach to good
government did incorporate the classical categories associated with these
themes – the rule of law, government by good ruling class, government or
mixed constitution24 – it takes on a heightened significance precisely by virtue
of this analogy, which was typical of humanism (microcosm-macrocosm) and
was particularly recurrent throughout the Italian treatise tradition dealing
with oikonomia, above all in the 16th and 17th centuries. It was a tradition im-
bued with the profound conviction that the economic approach constituted
‘‘a valid tool for regulating both family and civil affairs: hence the frequent
association, found in almost all the treatises, between home and city, govern-
ment of the home and political government, father and prince’’.25
23 In many respects this conundrum can be likened to the so-called Bo¨chenforde paradox: ‘‘the
secularized state lives on presuppositions it is unable to guarantee’’ (E.W. BO¨CHENFORDE, ‘‘La for-
mazione dello stato come processo di secolarizzazione’’ (1967), in P. PRODI – L. SARTORI (eds.), Cri-
stianesimo e potere (Bologna, EDB, 1986), p. 121); on which, most recently, J. HABERMAS, ‘‘I fonda-
menti morali prepolitici dello stato liberale’’, in J. RATZINGER – J. HABERMAS, Etica, religione e Stato
liberale (2004) (Brescia, Morcelliana, 2005), pp. 21-40.
24 Since the crucial role assigned to the middle class in terms of social equilibrium, Einaudi
refers to ‘‘Good government’’ as ‘‘mixed constitution’’ in the same sense used by Adam Smith in the
third book of The Wealth of Nation, in A. SMITH, Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence
of Adam Smith (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 405 and 412, which has properly been recog-
nised as the ‘‘locus classicus of the theme of commerce and liberty’’ (D. FORBES, ‘‘Sceptical Whiggism,
Commerce and Liberty’’, in Essay on Adam Smith, Glasgow Edition cit., p. 193). See also D. WINCH,
Adam Smith’s Politics. An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge, Cambridge University
press, 1978), p. 70.
25 D. FRIGO, Il padre di famiglia. Governo della casa e governo civile nella tradizione dell’ ‘‘eco-
nomica’’ tra Cinque e Seicento (Roma, Bulzoni, 1985), p. 68.
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The vision of the ancient regime and the systems of thought that underpinned it,
as portrayed and made visibile by the treatises on oikonomia, thus ranges over a far
broader horizon than the purely domestic context, and encompasses deep-set mental
structures. It conjures up a type of political and social framework that is not defined in
opposition to the private sphere, but rather by starting out from this very sphere: it
therefore become possible to theorize ‘‘good government’’ of the city, or of the
‘‘republic’’, only insofar as ‘‘good government’’ of the home has already been delineated
and implemented. From this point of view oikonomia forms part ‘‘of a general project
of ‘constitution’ [also in the sense of ‘institution’]26 of the old regime; it is a backdrop
that reflects and allows the further visualization of certain ‘unwritten’ rules that are the
supporting structures of the entire organization of the early modern age.27
However, these observations should not lead to the mistaken belief that
Einaudi’s aim was to restore the order of bygone times. For as has been noted,
in his capacity as an authoritative ‘‘minister of public opinion’’ Einaudi had
provided ‘‘his own running commentary on the great process of transforma-
tion’’ experienced by Italy, thereby building ‘‘at the same time a model of the
ideal society, less distant from Italian society than might be thought’’.28 But I
would argue that the crucial point does not reside in investigating the degree
of realism of this model. Rather, what is important is to focus on the model
itself and to enquire into the meaning of (and arising from) the gap between
the model and reality. In other words, if good government is the answer Ei-
naudi provides, in that particular historical context, for an Italy that was en-
during the agonizing torment of war and fascism, then by the same token
Good government is the response to the deep-seated need, felt by every com-
munity, to share a representation-vision of justice and the good that endows
men in society with a shared sense of common action (suffice it to mention
that Einaudi included in the collection Il buongoverno [Good government]
several details from the well known fresco by Lorenzetti, which the rules of
Siena demanded should be visible on the walls of the ‘‘Palazzo Pubblico’’).
Thus the passages pertaining to the analogy between government of the home
and government of res publica cited above serve as a preview to a more gen-
eral interpretation of the Einaudian quest for a liberal form of good govern-
ment, a quest prompted by the need to gain insight into the dynamics of those
26 Here the Author refers to the concept of ‘‘Consitution’’ as used by O. BRUNNER, ‘‘La ‘Casa
come complesso’ e l’antica ‘economica’ europea’’, in ID., Per una nuova costituzione economica e so-
ciale (1968), it. transl. (Milano, Vita e pensiero, 1970), pp. 133-164.
27 Ibid., p. 200 (my italics).
28 R. FAUCCI, Einaudi (Torino, UTET, 1986), p. 417.
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‘‘deep-seated mental structures’’, those ‘‘‘unwritten’ rules which act as the
supporting structures of the entire organization’’ of society. Einaudian good
government is therefore a ‘‘project of ‘constitution’ ’’, eternally under construc-
tion and never fully ‘‘instituted’’, studded with metaphors, narrations and
images acting as the backcloth through which the ‘‘invisible’’ and founding
rules of the social order ‘‘are reflected and visualized’’.
2. CONCRETELY: THE ‘‘FATHER-MASTER’’ AND THE ‘‘SON-PUPIL’’. REFORMS OR
REVOLUTION?
If the relation between father and son has, since earliest times, always
been one of the most concrete figures of the law-freedom nexus, that between
master and pupil is no less evocative of the ties linking the two aspects. It is no
coincidence that the paired terms appearing in the title – ‘‘father-master’’ and
‘‘son-pupil’’ – draws on an expression used by Busino to depict the ‘‘myster-
ious’’ relation between Einaudi and Ernesto Rossi (see infra). But it is also
possible to extend this figure of the intermeshing of law and freedom to
the relations Einaudi entertained with another two celebrated pupils, Carlo
Rosselli and Piero Gobetti, although it should be borne in mind that on ac-
count of their early and tragic death, the relationship was interrupted too
early for Einaudi to have been able to develop with these two pupils the spe-
cial (but no less problematic) relationship he had with Rossi. For the present
purposes it is interesting to note that the themes developed in the master’s
discussions with his pupils reveal the presence of an additional problem,
which made itself felt rather strongly and significantly. This was the relation
between tradition and criticism, which can in many respects be assimilated
to the figure of the law-freedom interaction.
Once again, and re-stated in slightly different terms, there emerged the
issue that was at the forefront of debate in various forms from the end of
the nineteenth century and throughout the greater part of the twentieth cen-
tury, focusing on the burning question: reform or revolution?29 All three of
the above-mentioned pupils were, albeit to varying extents and in varying
ways, mesmerized by socialist doctrine. And they were attracted – this was
especially true of Rosselli and Gobetti – by the clarion call of the Russian re-
29 The question is very similar to that discussed by Marcuse and Popper (where Einaudi’s posi-
tion can be assimilated to the Popperian thesis, despite the different epistemological and philosophi-
cal foundations). H. MARCUSE – K.R. POPPER, Reform or Revolution? A Confrontation (1971), Engl.
transl. (Chicago, New University Press, 1976).
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volution, the echoes of which were not slow to reach Italy, further amplified
by the struggles of the red two-year period. During the course of these events,
Einaudi reached a conviction he would thereafter hold unshakably, which he
expressed icastically in the following terms: ‘‘revolutionaries are like children:
they want to take the production machine to bits to see what it’s like inside, in
the illusion they can then put the pieces together again better, without the
present-day friction, which they attribute to capitalism’’. The Einaudian cri-
tique is based on an institutional and evolutionary vision of the market.
The market, Einaudi wrote, is a ‘‘highly delicate and extremely complicated’’
mechanism, which only ‘‘the slow action of the centuries and the cooperation
of millions of patient, far-sighted, inspired and hard-working men’’ can truly
create.30 In other words, as the Piedmontese liberal never tired of repeating,
while the market was not the best of all possible worlds (and for this very rea-
son it could always be reformed) it had nevertheless assured the multiplication
of previously unheard-of opportunities and prospects, which no other eco-
nomic system known so far had ever succeeded in achieving. ‘‘Breaking down
this highly delicate and extremely complex mechanism’’, Einaudi argued,
amounted to a leap into the unknown and was likely to cause more harm than
it was intended to remedy.
The criticisms Rosselli advanced against his master shortly after the pub-
lication of La bellezza della lotta, i.e. in the immediate wake of the red two-
year period, are emblematic in this respect. For Rosselli ‘‘the drama of official
Italian liberalism’’ was that of having undergone a transformation from a pro-
gressive-oriented to a ‘‘conservative’’ approach. It ‘‘remained a theoretical
construct, as if suspended in a void of concepts’’ and it was ‘‘embroiled in
the contradiction between method and system’’, the ‘‘method’’ being repre-
sented by the theory and the preaching of struggle, antagonism and discord
(in primis between workers and entrepreneurs), while the ‘‘system’’ was the
capitalist-bourgeois system, accepted as a necessary premise, indisputable
and insurmountable.31
Rosselli’s argument has been seen as voicing a critical view of
30 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Rivoluzionari ed organizzatori’’ (1920), in Cronache cit., vol. V, 1963, pp. 750-
751.
31 C. ROSSELLI, ‘‘Luigi Einaudi e il movimento operaio’’ (1924), in Socialismo liberale e altri
scritti, J. ROSSELLI (ed.) (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1973), pp. 44-51. On the distinction between ‘‘method’’
and ‘‘system’’, C. ROSSELLI, ‘‘Liberalismo socialista’’ (1923), in Scritti politici, P. BAGNOLI – Z. CIUF-
FOLETTI (eds.) (Napoli, Guida, 1988), pp. 57-58. In formulating this distinction, Rosselli seems to
have drawn inspiration from his cousin and friend Alessandro Levi, a historian of the Risorgimento
and philosopher of law: A. LEVI, ‘‘Liberalismo come stato d’animo’’, in La rivoluzione liberale (5 June
1923), p. 72.
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one of the weak points of a conception of liberalism as a mere complex of unchange-
able rules of the game, devoid of any internal developmental principle, and above all
lacking any realization that the victor may change the rules definitively in his own fa-
vour. Rosselli contended that Einaudi failed to realize, or did not wish to perceive, in
what direction the ‘‘struggle’’ – on the beauty of which Einaudi had waxed eloquent –
was moving, namely the victory of one side or the other, in a manner that might per-
haps not be reversible.32
But in this regard it should be noted that while Einaudi, as an economist,
did have a tendency, especially in this early phase of his thought, to hyposta-
tize the bourgeois liberal state, considering it as a framework of laws suited to
disciplining struggle within civil society, it is equally true that the framework
was by no means conceived as unchangeable: its developmental principle
rested on the crucial issue of critical debate within public opinion. The real
problem, however, resided in the fact that this legal framework presupposed
a shared axiological horizon which would allow struggle, taken as competition
and debate, to come about in the form of peaceful struggle. Now, what the
struggles of the red two-year period had severely undermined was precisely
the complex of values on which the liberal state of the bourgeois era had been
built up. Thus if Rosselli had not fully understood the principle of gradualist
reformism of his master, Einaudi, on the other hand, reflecting critically on
the red two-year period and the emergence of fascism in its wake, began to
construe good government as a problem of shared values.
In an article in memory of Gobetti (1926), the master seems to chart once
more the distance that had separated him from the latter (and perhaps also
from Rosselli), almost as if seeking to span the gap. For despite acknowled-
ging Einaudi as his master,33 Gobetti had drawn closer to the thought of
Gramsci and the group of communists of Ordine Nuovo, above all in his last
years. In Einaudi’s eyes, this signalled that the time had come to reflect on the
problem of how to hold together tradition and criticism, conservation and in-
novation.
On the one hand, the liberal in him maintained that it was still of value to
recognize ‘‘the utility of religiously observed traditions, of the ancient institu-
tions which impose themselves on peoples almost as if they were endowed
with a supernatural virtue; hence the very serious social danger arising if revo-
lutionary events shake up that sense of taboo which holds the basic social struc-
32 R. FAUCCI, Einaudi cit., p. 222.
33 See P. GOBETTI, ‘‘Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi’’ (1922), in Scritti politici, P. SPRIANO (ed.)
(Torino, G. Einaudi, 1960), pp. 322-336.
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ture firm’’. Re-reading Le Play, who investigated the reasons underlying pros-
perous and stable societies, Einaudi explains by means of a metaphor that in-
stitutions are founded on a sort of ‘‘magic spell’’: ‘‘all the social world’s a stage
curtain; and behind it there’s nothing’’. Yet it is precisely this stage act that
enables societies to hold together, which implies that the critical and revolu-
tionary spirit can push things up to a certain limit, beyond which, however,
‘‘the paper castle [which] stood firm of its own accord under the shelter of
the spell’’, collapses.34
On the other hand, even if his pupil was not convinced by these com-
ments on Le Play, he could nevertheless clearly see, Einaudi went on,
that the cult of traditions, the continuity of the home environment, the respect for
saving that enables people to build their home or set up their business, or till their
land, are powerful ideas and that such ideas must be set on a par with critical and
creative thought, with the revolutionizing machine of the economy and with the pro-
found aspiration of the working masses to move upwards, disrupting the existing
social equilibrium.
Such ideas, Einaudi felt, ‘‘have just as much right of citizenship in that
ideal city he was shaping in his mind, a city that is fine to behold because it
is not rigidly motionless but is continually in transformation under the con-
trasting pressures of the many forces that act upon it’’.35 With a classic pro-
jective judgment, Einaudi was thereby making a first attempt to focus on the
‘‘ideal city’’ as the core problem of good government, which is such only if it
succeeds in deriving its solidity from a dynamic equilibrium of latent and con-
trasting forces.
With regard to the relationship between Einaudi and Rossi, which devel-
oped above all in epistolary form through their correspondence when Rossi
was in internal exile on the island of Ventotene, it was dialectically the most
critical and fertile of his experiences of interaction with his pupils. The issue
on which debate centered most intensely was that of the limit of reformism:
that is to say, how far can reforms be driven without overstepping the limit
and escalating into revolution? The very same problem of the limit, interest-
ingly, comes to the fore in the essence of the master-pupil interaction as well:
up to what point should the master instruct, that is to say, educate, his pupil?
In this educational process, should the master not set the conditions for his
34 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Piero Gobetti nelle memorie e nelle impressioni dei suoi maestri’’, Il Baretti (16
March 1926), p. 80 (my italics).
35 Ibid., p. 80 (my italics).
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own ‘disappearance’, so that the pupil can begin to walk on his own legs?
And, conversely, how far can the pupil express a critical stance towards the
master without undermining that very educational process which, as such,
constitutes the basis of their interaction?
Precisely in this regard, and pondering on the profound difference in
character and temperament between Einaudi and Rossi – the former calm,
prudent, tempering and apparently cold, the latter full of warmth, sponta-
neous, sharp and to the point, trenchant to the limit of flippancy –, Giovanni
Busino raised the question of whether here one might not be ‘‘facing the mys-
tery of the father-master and the son-pupil’’.36 In this meeting and clash of
positions concerning the limits to be placed on reformism, the debate be-
tween Einaudi and Rossi was destined to intensify in a crescendo of polemics,
almost to the point of breaking up the relationship.37 Einaudi’s pupil was per-
fectly aware of the distance that separated him from his master, so much so as
to declare himself ‘‘an exceedingly Jacobinical Jacobin’’. On the other hand,
Rossi did up to a certain point share Einaudi’s gradualist reformism, albeit ar-
guing that this could be successful only in ‘‘normal times’’ and not in the
midst of a ‘‘crisis’’ period, when ‘‘the old rules of the game become an obsta-
cle’’ and other rules have to be set up. The latter statement is of extreme im-
portance, and while Rossi subsequently let it drop and did not elaborate on
the matter further, Einaudi himself would later take up the question again
at the dawn of the Constituent Assembly, when discussion focused on the
problem of ‘‘legally unsolvable dilemmas’’ and on the possibility of overriding
even the constitutional order (see section 3.2). During their exchange of cor-
respondence, the debate reached a point where the master confessed his
regret at his pupil’s infatuation with
methods of law-making imposed by compulsion, rapidly, with the force of a revolu-
tion that has set itself a program and is determined to implement it, crushing any
form of opposition. It truly pains me that this mentality has been endorsed by your-
self as well. I have no faith in this type of law-making, and it is my belief that the poi-
36 G. BUSINO, ‘‘Un’amicizia esemplare’’, in L. EINAUDI – E. ROSSI, Carteggio (1925-1961),
G. BUSINO and S. MARTINOTTI DORIGO (eds.) (Torino, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 1988), p. 4.
37 In the following citations I refer above all to the exchange of correspondence between Ei-
naudi and Rossi in the period between the beginning of 1941 up to the beginning of 1943, in
L. EINAUDI – E. ROSSI, Carteggio cit., pp. 65-121; and ‘‘Aggiunte e complementi al carteggio L. Ei-
naudi, E. Rossi’’, G. BUSINO – P. GIORDANA (eds.), Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, XXXVII
(2003), pp. 293-446: 399-401. I dwelt more extensively on this debate in Il liberalismo di Luigi
Einaudi o del buongoverno cit., pp. 244-252. Cf. also R. FAUCCI, ‘‘Einaudi, Croce, Rossi: il liberali-
smo fra scienza economica e filosofia’’, Quaderni di storia dell’economia politica, VII, n. 1 (1989),
pp. 113-133.
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son the French revolution left in 19th-century society, which has spilled over into the
present century, derives to a large extent from this cause.
In the attempt to clarify this position, and accusing his pupil of an excess
of ‘‘geometric’’ spirit conducted in the name of a reason that bordered on
‘‘pure logic’’, Einaudi put forward the following thesis: ‘‘a society is sound
and lively and vibrant only if it has within itself many incomprehensible things.
If the men of a society begin to reason about everything, one can be quite cer-
tain that such a society is close to beaking down’’.38 This argument could
hardly fail to infuriate his pupil, who, feeling he could almost no longer recog-
nize or agree with (what was in his view) his master’s ‘‘illuministic’’ teaching,
objected:
What is this lack of faith in the Goddess Reason? Where do you think we should
stop, sir, when developing an argument? Who should decide which points are not to
be questioned? As far as I am concerned I am going to continue beating my knuckles
against all the institutions that happen to stand before me in order to try to establish
whether they are made of marble or wood or plaster, and I am going to continue ask-
ing, just as my old friend Bentham did: ‘‘What is the use?’’, without ever allowing
myself to be imposed upon by tradition.
By the time the debate reached this point, a misunderstanding had occurred.
The pupil interpreted his master’s argument as a sort of invitation to genuflect
before tradition (whatever it may be), tradition having been assumed as dog-
matic. On the other hand, when the pupil himself effectively professed his un-
conditional faith (‘‘trust’’) in the ‘‘Goddess Reason’’, and also in the criterion for
meting out a judgment on ‘‘institutions’’ shaped in the utilitarian-Benthamian
mould (‘‘What is the use?’’), he unwittingly testified to his belonging to two tra-
ditions, illuminism and utiliarianism, no less dogmatically assumed.39
However, it is perfectly legitimate to conjecture that Einaudi was trying to
reformulate the problem of the ‘‘invisible’’ foundations40 (as he would later
38 As noted by Faucci (Einaudi, Croce, Rossi cit.), Einaudi’s position against the supporters of
authoritarian intervention, and the related argument that there exist many ‘‘incomprehensible
things’’, has a certain resemblance to that of Hayek: ‘‘even if such power is not in itself bad, its ex-
ercise is likely to impede the functioning of those spontaneous ordering forces by which, without
understanding them, man is in fact so largely assisted in the pursuit of his aims’’ (F.A. HAYEK,
‘‘The Pretence of Knowledge’’ (1974), in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the His-
tory of Ideas (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 42-43).
39 I refer here to the concept of ‘‘dogma’’ as formulated by P. LEGENDRE, Della societa` come
testo cit.
40 On ‘‘invisible organizations and invisible concrete foundation’’, understood as ‘‘that which
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designate them), or of the ‘‘spell’’ that holds up the fabric of society. This was
a problem he had already touched on in the reflection on Gobetti, and the
reformulation he proposed in the present circumstance was even more allu-
sive. Einaudi would offer no further precise thematization until he later expli-
citly raised the problem of legitimacy (see section 3.2). The misunderstanding
was further aggravated by the failure, on both sides, to clarify what was meant
by the term ‘‘reason’’. The term is invoked several times but with different
and sometimes overlaid meanings: ‘‘critical reason’’, ‘‘pure logic’’ (or con-
structivist reason), ‘‘means-end rationality’’.
In any case, the divergences between master and pupil could hardly be
described as clear-cut. The tensions were mediated by their common search
for the ideal ‘‘good government’’ around which a cohesive society could de-
velop and withstand disruptive pressures, and with which both men could es-
tablish a bond of allegiance that would accommodate their respective distinc-
tions.41 It is in fact no coincidence that it was the ‘‘son-pupil’’, no less faithful
than he was critical (faithful precisely because the ‘‘father-master’’ allowed
scope for criticism, which was in fact scope for freedom),42 who saw to the
editing and publication of Einaudi’s selected essays entitled Il buongoverno
[Good government]. By the same token, it was once again the pupil who wrote
the counterpart: Il malgoverno [Bad Government].43
3. IN GENERAL: AUCTORITAS, LEX, VERITAS
In order to gain insight into the specificity of Einaudi’s liberal good gov-
ernment, it is helpful, as a first step, to outline some commonplace concep-
precedes the established law’’, see P. HERITIER, Uscire dal secondo millennio? Problemi metodologici
nel discorso sulla liberta` cit., pp. 93-100.
41 According to Giovanni Busino, they shared a common ‘‘world view’’: ‘‘It is the belief that
freedom is an ethical fact, it is an individual and social practice in everyday life and in history. In
order for it to prevail, it is indispensable for there to be struggle, diversity, discord, debate. Life
is freedom and freedom is variety and contrast. Being free means being able to move within a dense
network of interrelations among men and among groups, within the fabric of natural and social con-
straints and of rules, values and signs that fix limits and indicate forced directions. Moving amid so
many obstacles, in order to live and act as a free man, requires exact, concrete knowledge of such
obstacles, and it calls for the formulation of suitable means to face them. Acting, knowing, being free
are inseparable. Without freedom, civilization cannot live’’ (G. BUSINO, Un’amicizia esemplare cit.,
pp. 6-7).
42 Rossi confessed this aspect in a letter written to his wife on 25th August 1940, where he also
stressed Einaudi’s great epistemological humility, cf. E. ROSSI,Miserie e splendori del confino di polizia.
Lettere da Ventotene 1939-1943, M. MAGINI (ed.) (Milano, Feltrinelli, 1981), pp. 69-72 (my italics).
43 E. ROSSI, Il malgoverno (Bari, Laterza, 1954).
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tions on the function of the public sphere in the so-called bourgeois state. We
may, firstly, analyse the following quotation where, in reference to the princi-
ple ‘‘Veritas non auctoritas facit legem’’,44 it is stated that nineteenth-century
liberalism held the view that
since it is impossible to suppress public power [...], such power must at least be im-
personal, the expression not of a will but of a universal reason which does not derive
from an authority but from the truth. This truth is ‘the law’. Thus the problem will
not be that of knowing who is the ‘good ruler’ or which is the ‘good government’,
but rather of establishing which procedures lead towards reason and truth [...]. Ac-
cordingly, for nineteenth-century liberalism, the activity of the state is reduced to
the essential, to production of the law through discussion and ‘balancing’ within
the legislative power. But were liberalism to be viewed purely as a theory of the limits
of political power, to be summarized in the formula ‘how much, how far, to govern’,
it would fail to be a complete doctrine of the state, given that such a doctrine cannot
neglect to address the more ancient question: ‘how to govern’.45
This type of reconstruction of modernity and liberalism presupposes a
series of categories and dichotomies which have likewise become common-
places. Einaudi’s liberal good government, on the other hand, appears to re-
fute these commonplaces. We will list them here, with the proviso that they
will be examined in detail further on: a) the reduction of good government
and, more generally, the problem of legitimacy, to a purely procedural criter-
ion; b) the – typically modern – reduction of auctoritas to potestas; c) the so-
lution of the problem of power through the mechanism of checks and bal-
ances; d) the superiority of the ‘‘Rule of law’’ over ‘‘rule by men’’, a
dichotomy which, from the historiographic point of view, neglects the funda-
44 As is well known, the triad Veritas-Auctoritas-Lex evokes a series of problems that have been
pervasive throughout the history of western theological, political and juridical thought. For a revisi-
tation of the Hobbesian arguments: U. SCARPELLI, ‘‘Auctoritas non veritas facit legem’’, Rivista di
filosofia, LXXV (1984), pp. 27-43; for a focus on the philosophical juridical approach: F. VIOLA,
Autorita` e ordine del diritto (Torino, Giappichelli, 1984); for a complete political-philosophical
and juridical reconstruction cf. G. PRETEROSSI, Autorita` (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002). From the point
of view of my reconstruction, it is important to re-read Einaudian liberalism in order to become
aware that in Einaudi’s thought Auctoritas, Veritas and Lex appear with the always subtle and elusive
characteristics of the limit: with its manner of being potentially, and at one and the same time, that
which ‘‘clips’’ but also that which ‘‘blows below’’ the wings of freedom. I have tried to show that this
same problem is also found, in a structural analogy between legitimation of power and the legitima-
tion of savoirs, with regard to juridical or economic ‘‘Science’’: P. SILVESTRI, ‘‘Veritas, Auctoritas,
Lex. Scienza economica e sfera pubblica: sulla normativita` del Terzo’’, Il pensiero economico italiano,
17, n. 2 (2009).
45 P. PASQUINO, ‘‘Prefazione’’ to C. SCHMITT, Parlamentarismo e democrazia (1923), it. transl.
(Cosenza, Marco editore, 1999), p. XIV (my italics). Cf. also J. HABERMAS, Storia e critica dell’opinione
pubblica cit., p. 103.
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mental re-elaboration-transformation of good government between the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, as mediated by the treatises on oikonomia
(we will not dwell further on this particular point, see supra).
3.1. ‘‘E´lite’’ as ‘‘authority’’
It is important first and foremost to note that Einaudian research on the
good elite focuses on figures of authority that do not derive their legitimacy
only from their ‘prudent’ mode of action and their knowledge of economic
science as a ‘science of good government’. Rather, they are legitimated to
the extent to which their action is undertaken in a context of values, prefer-
ably shared values.46
As Einaudi developed these themes, his ideas became more distant from
Mosca and Pareto’s political theories, and he began to criticize both their con-
figuration of the elite and their manner of theorizing power legitimation stra-
tegies. Briefly, their theory maintains that power is always held by an e´lite that
obtains legitimacy and consensus by appealing to the authority of ‘‘common
opinion’’, ‘‘myth’’, ‘‘dogmas’’, ‘‘political formulas’’ (Mosca), ‘‘derivations’’
(Pareto), which exploit the irrational (passional, emotive or affective) sphere
of the governed or the masses. Einaudi’s growing distance from the sociolo-
gical conceptions of the ruling class that dominated politics was prompted by
his reflection on the theory of the e´lite in Fre´de´ric Le Play (1936).47 As we will
see in greater detail further on, a number of reasons can be put forward to
illustrate when and why Einaudi assigned a meaning to the concepts of ‘‘taboo’’,
‘‘myth’’, ‘‘dogmas’’ or ‘‘formulas’’ that was not necessarily negative, but
could instead be described as neutral. Here we will merely note Einaudi’s
significant emphasis on the concepts of ‘‘natural authority’’ and ‘‘social
authority’’ (the latter in the sense of socially recognized) utilized by the
French reformist writer. ‘Authority’ is conceived here as pre-political and
pre-juridical, or better, as emerging, so to speak, ‘‘from the bottom up’’, from
the substrate of social relations.48 This authority
46 See also M.L. SALVADORI, ‘‘Einaudi e la teoria della classe politica’’, in Luigi Einaudi nella
cultura, nella societa` e nella politica del Novecento, R. MARCHIONATTI – P. SODDU (eds.) (Firenze,
Leo Olschki, 2010), pp. 269-283.
47 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Il peccato originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play’’ (1936), in
ID., Saggi bibliografici e storici intorno alle dottrine economiche (Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura,
1953), pp. 307-344.
48 It is worth recalling that Einaudi was a great supporter of local self-government precisely be-
cause it offered a model of a ‘‘spontaneous’’ community that rises ‘‘from the bottom up’’: L. EINAU-
DI, ‘‘Via il prefetto!’’ (1944), in Il buongoverno cit., p. 59.
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is vested in ‘those who have, through their virtue, become the models of private life,
who demonstrate a strong trend towards the good [...] and who, with the example of
their family and their working life and business, with their scrupulous dedication to
the decalogue and customary practices of social peace, gain the affection and respect
of all those who surround them, and thus ensure that prosperity and peace reign
throughout the local area.49
Now, since there are major differences between Einaudi and Pareto, it is
helpful to compare these two figures in order to highlight the specificity of
Einaudian liberalism.50 With regard to a comparative assessment of their ac-
tivity as editorialists and essayists, it has been pointed out that unlike the well-
known scepticism that characterized Pareto, Einaudi’s Cronache ‘‘reveal the
constant conviction that the message will not fall on deaf ears’’ and that
‘‘homo politicus, if appropriately enlightened, pursues objectives that are
not in contrast with those of homo oeconomicus’’.51 It is worth keeping in
mind that the Einaudian homo oeconomicus is an ‘‘idealtype’’ embodied in
the ethos of the middle class (struggle and sacrifice to improve one’s own con-
ditions, the ethic of hard work, skill, honesty, frugality and prudence) and
whose conduct is thus ethical-economic. Accordingly, the above-mentioned
conception can be summarized in the claim that in Einaudi’s vision the illu-
ministic-liberal ideal of rationalizing politics in the name of morals signified
embracing the aspiration that politics, or rather, the policy maker, should
be tuned to the individual and social moral code of the middle class, thereby
contributing to harmony between civil society and the government. It is pre-
cisely the public sphere that is called upon to enact this mediation.
In the Einaudian perspective, the circle of an ideal model of public space
is completed into the nexus between the three spheres of the press, the par-
liament and the ruling class. Public opinion (the press and parliament), acting
through struggle and critical debate involving ideas, values and visions of the
world, not only fulfils the function of becoming a principle of selection of the
‘‘truth’’ – for the purposes of institution of the ‘‘law’’ and recognition of its
49 ID., ‘‘Il peccato originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play’’ cit., p. 316.
50 I addressed the relation between Einaudi and Mosca in ‘‘Il buongoverno nel pensiero di Ei-
naudi e Mosca: tra governo della legge e governo degli uomini’’, Annali della Fondazione Luigi Ei-
naudi, XL (2006), pp. 157-196; as regards Einaudi and Pareto, I take up again and further develop
some considerations in F. FORTE – P. SILVESTRI, ‘‘Pareto’s Sociological Maximum of Utility of the
Community and the Theory of the Elites’’, in The Big Book in Fiscal Sociology, J.G. BACKHAUS
(ed.) (Heidelberg - New York, forthcoming: 2012).
51 R. FAUCCI, La scienza economica in Italia. Da Francesco Ferrara a Luigi Einaudi (1850-1943)
(Napoli, Guida, 1982), pp. 28-29.
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legitimacy – but it also becomes a mechanism for choosing and controlling
(and, if necessary, overthrowing) the ruling class, and thus for recognizing
its (legitimate) ‘‘authority’’. According to this model, the best ruling class is
expected to emerge through the electoral competition for votes, under the
eyes of an illuminated and critical public opinion. It should be noted, though,
that confidence in the possibility of this type of mediation accomplished by
the public sphere depends to a large extent on the presupposition that good
rulers – who are operating in pursuit of good government, that is to say, an
ideal and shared model of society – would be expected to emerge from the
middle class, the embodiment of the above described virtues. This middle
class, conceived as the fulcrum of the public sphere, would play an equally
ideal role of mediety-mediation in the social equilibrium.
In contrast, for Pareto, ‘‘good government’’, reductively assumed to be
merely the problem of good rulers, is simply impossible.52 The reasons un-
derlying this impossibility can, in my view, be traced back to the lack of any
positive function of the public sphere in Paretian thought. Rather, the pub-
lic sphere, as conceived by Pareto, was seen only as the place where ideol-
ogies and values dictated by sentiment and an emotive response, which are
in their very essence irrational, clash without any possibility of mediation. It
should also be pointed out that this manner of thinking conceals a confu-
sion and inability to distinguish between ‘‘incommensurability’’ and ‘‘in-
comparability’’: for even if one believes that subjective values are incom-
mensurable, this need not mean that they are by their very nature
incomparable.53 In contrast, the Einaudian conception of the public sphere
starts out from the idea that comparison and exchange of ideas and values
can open up a route to mediation. Furthermore, as an advocate of the
beauty of struggle, Einaudi sees the comparison-contrast of ideas as desir-
able, so that the quest for truth, for improvement and the new can always
be left open.
52 V. PARETO, ‘‘Il crepuscolo della liberta`’’ (1904), in Oeuvres comple`tes, t. XVIII, E´crits poli-
tiques, II, Reazione, liberta`, fascismo (Gene`ve, Droz, 1989), pp. 399-413: 411.
53 Here I use the distinction made by G. MARRAMAO, La passione del presente. Breve lessico del-
la modernita`-mondo (Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2008), p. 42, where the author argues that is it ne-
cessary to (re)consider – and thus seek to go beyond the perspectives of Rawls and Habermas – the
role of rhetoric in the public sphere, provided that it is a case of ‘‘rhetoric with proof’’: ‘‘only by
adopting this kind of criterion will it be possible to elude the paralyzing dilemma between the abso-
lutism of truth and point-of-view relativism, taken as mirror-image and opposite forms of justified
self-reference. Not everything that presents itself as incommensurable – i.e. quite literally, that cannot
be reduced to a homogeneous criterion of measurement (for example, the values or beliefs of different
cultural contexts) – must thereby necessarily be regarded as incomparable’’.
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I would therefore argue that one of the problems of Pareto’s political-
sociological theories lies in his conception of struggle, in particular struggle
for power, as well as his conception of ‘‘social heterogeneousness’’ (today,
it would be referred to as value polytheism). The Paretian conception of ‘‘social
heterogeneousness’’ is extreme to the point that he is unable to conceive of
any form of mediation between rulers and the ruled: the struggle for power
is a struggle with no holds barred, history is but an ‘‘e´lite graveyard’’ and
‘‘freedom is a luxury’’.54
But one might have felt moved to address the following question to Pa-
reto: if everything is just power, then what is the point of voicing your opinion?
Why on earth devote yourself to the exercise of criticism? What is it that spurs
you to engage in critical debate? Or alternatively, as suggested in Einaudi’s
objections, if history is none other than a cyclical succession of ‘‘the oppressed
and the oppressors, subordinate classes and dominating classes’’, if rulers ob-
tain obedience, legitimacy and consensus only through tools that are effec-
tively ‘‘pseudo-logical [i.e. ‘‘myth’’, ‘‘formulas’’, ‘‘derivations’’] helpful for giv-
ing a false stamp of approval to the brute fact’’ of power,55 then everything is
power. And yet, equally, if everything is power, then nothing is such any long-
er. Any regulatory criterion is lost, as is any ‘‘ideal schema’’, to quote the term
Einaudi adopted as a means of distinguishing good rulers from the bad ones
and good ‘‘myth’’ and/or ‘‘formulas’’ of legitimation from the bad versions.
But for Einaudi, unlike Pareto, evil is not a necessary and ineluctable datum
that is reiterated throughout history according to the logic of eternal recur-
rence: history is not cyclical, and the future is open. If Pareto held good gov-
ernment to be impossible, for Einaudi good government is another world that
is (still and always) possible.56
In short, the great difference between Pareto ad Einaudi lies in the fact
that the latter attributed enormous importance to the public sphere, both
in terms of its function as a critical constraint on power, and also as the ‘‘third
54 As shown in Busino’s very effective synthesis, in Pareto’s political-sociological thought ‘‘one
reality alone is ever-lasting: namely, there is a stratification in political and social life, that of the ruling
and the ruled. It is essentially oligarchic. Politicians promise radical change but as soon as they have
come to power they defend a society which has nothing to do with whatever they promised. Then,
social life is hell, cruelty is unending and the social agents are victims of illusion and myths. Men have
only one small light at their disposal, a single weapon with which to fight: science’’ (G. BUSINO, ‘‘The
signification of Vilfredo Pareto’s sociology’’, Revue europe´enne des sciences sociales, 38, n. 117
(2000), pp. 217-228: 226).
55 L. EINAUDI, Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria (1940, second edition revised and exten-
ded) (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1959), p. 290.
56 Symptomatic in this regard are the conclusions of the essay on Le Play: L. EINAUDI, Il peccato
originale e la teoria della classe eletta in Federico Le Play cit., p. 328 (my italics).
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place’’ of mediation between the ruled and the rulers, and, additionally, as a
place where it is possible to cooperate by starting out from (or with a view to)
shared values.
Einaudi had reached these same conclusions in his attempt to distinguish
the ‘‘optimum tax’’ from the ‘‘taille tax’’ (that is to say, a tax that is perceived
as an imposed levy). The ‘‘optimality’’ of the tax could not be based exclu-
sively on a cost-and-benefit criterion, and it inevitably raised the problem
of power, leading to the need to discriminate between rulers who rule with
a view to promoting the common good and those who rule for their own gain,
or otherwise stated, to distinguish the ‘‘finance of the Periclean city’’ from the
‘‘finance of the tyrannical government’’.57 In this sense, the conclusions put
forward in Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria are emblematic:
If it’s a question of coercing people into paying taxes, then any old despot is per-
fectly able to do that. But the leader chosen by the valentior pars of the citizens [...]
intends to elevate the mortals of the earthly city to the divine city, where the word
‘‘tax’’ is unknown, because all the people know the reason and the value of the sacrifice
offered on the altar of the common good.58
3.2. ‘‘Rule of law’’, constitutional order, legitimacy
In Einaudi’s thought one finds no hierarchical opposition between the
‘‘rule of law’’ and ‘‘rule by men’’. This was not simply because he was firmly
convinced that in order to make good laws it is essential to have good (and
prudent) rulers, or because, as is often said, laws exist only insofar as they
are made by men (although in this case a distinction should be drawn between
governing per leges and governing sub lege):59 rather, it was also because even
the supreme constitutional Law cannot, according to Einaudi, be absolutized
or hypostatized, and it must remain open to the possibility of change. More-
over, the ‘‘rule of law’’ and ‘‘rule by men’’, inasmuch as these involve ‘ruling’
or ‘governing’ or ‘commanding’, need to be recognized in order to be obeyed.
But let us proceed step by step.
The expression ‘‘rule of law’’ [‘‘impero della legge’’]60 is used by the Pied-
montese liberal statesman in three different ways, in different contexts.
57 L. EINAUDI, Miti e paradossi della giustizia tributaria cit., pp. 263 and ff.
58 Ibid., p. 297.
59 N. BOBBIO, ‘‘Governo degli uomini o governo delle leggi?’’, in ID., Il futuro della democrazia
(Torino, G. Einaudi, 1991), pp. 175-179.
60 Einaudi’s phrase in Italian ‘‘Impero della legge’’ is, very probably, his translation of the ‘‘rule
of law’’. We hold the expression ‘‘impero della legge’’ significant because of its analogy, though
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Firstly, and in the generic formulation adopted in Verso la citta` divina, Einau-
di dwells on ‘‘the limited state which guarantees men the rule of law’’, under-
stood here ‘‘as a condition for anarchy of the spirits’’, that is to say, as a con-
dition for the pluralism of ideas, actions and visions of the world.61 Many
years later, musing on his earlier thoughts and turning over in his mind the
objection he had raised against Croce’s liberalism concerning the virtual indif-
ference of the latter towards the economical, legal and institutional aspect of
liberalism,62 Einaudi utilized the phrase ‘‘rule of law’’, describing it as a ‘‘ne-
cessary condition’’, albeit not a sufficient condition, for a free society. In his
view, the observance of these conditions ‘‘embodies, to a large extent, the
content of concrete liberalism, liberalism as political action. Clearly, this is
not all there is in liberalism’’, because ‘‘the life of a man living in society can-
not be infused from outside, but rather must come from an inner creative
force. This notwithstanding, forms themselves have a virtue of their own; only
within the forms can man satisfy the need for freedom, and undertake the ef-
fort to achieve material and moral elevation’’. But we are dealing here with
‘‘formal conditions or guarantees that are necessary so that men living in
never explicated by Einaudi, with the ‘‘impero della verita`’’ [‘‘rule of truth’’, see section 3.3]. On the
historical relationship between rule of law and constitution cf. C.H. MC ILWAIN, Constitutionalism:
ancient and modern (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University press, 1947); M. DOGLIANI, Introduzione al di-
ritto costituzionale (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1994). From a liberal point of view: cf. B. LEONI, Freedom
and the law (Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nostrand, 1961); F.A. VON HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty
(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960); ID., Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 3 volumes (London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973-1976-1979), and, more recently, V.J. VANBERG, ‘‘Liberal constitu-
tionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy’’, Constitutional Political Economy, 4/03/2010
(on line). For a re-reading of Leoni’s thought, also with particular reference to the criticisms raised
against von Hayek as the advocate of the continental ‘‘rule of law’’: C. LOTTIERI, Le ragioni del di-
ritto. Liberta` individuale e ordine giuridico nel pensiero di Bruno Leoni (Soveria Mannelli - Treviglio,
Rubbettino - Facco, 2006), pp. 13-50. For a different reading of Hayekian philosophy of law: P. HE-
RITIER, Ordine spontaneo ed evoluzione nel pensiero di Hayek (Napoli, Jovene, 1997), especially
pp. 243-294. From different perspectives: J. RAZ, ‘‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’’, in ID.,The Author-
ity of Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1979); ID., ‘‘The Politics of the Rule of Law’’, Ratio Juris, 3, n. 3
(1990), pp. 331-339; contra: F. VIOLA, ‘‘Il Rule of Law e il concetto di diritto’’, Ragion pratica (30
June 2008), pp. 151-168; E. COLOMBATTO, ‘‘It Was the Rule of Law, Will It Be the Rule of Judges?’’,
Revue e´conomique, 58, n. 6 (November 2007), pp. 1163-1180.
61 L. EINAUDI, Verso la citta` divina cit., pp. 32-36.
62 L. EINAUDI – B. CROCE, Liberismo e liberalismo, P. SOLARI (ed.) (Milano - Napoli, Ricciardi,
1957). On this debate cf., among others, B. LEONI, ‘‘Conversazioni su Einaudi e Croce’’, Biblioteca
della liberta`, XXII, n. 98 (July-September 1987), pp. 55-81; R. FAUCCI, Einaudi cit., pp. 294-302;
F. FORTE, ‘‘I liberalesimi di Einaudi e di Croce’’ (1989 and 1994), in ID., L’economia liberale di Luigi
Einaudi. Saggi (Firenze, Leo Olschki, 2009), pp. 193-221; P. SILVESTRI, Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi
o del buongoverno cit., chap. IV, pp. 191-232; I have tried to unravel the knotty points and the mis-
understandings of this debate in a critical-constructive approach in ‘‘Rileggendo Einaudi e Croce:
spunti per un liberalismo fondato su un’antropologia della liberta`’’, Annali della Fondazione Luigi
Einaudi, XLI (2007), pp. 201-240.
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society can be assured of a life lived in freedom’’.63 Finally, during his
exchange of ideas with Croce, Einaudi had introduced the concept of the rule
of law as a criterion to distinguish between liberalism-liberism (which for him
were strictly linked) on the one hand and socialism and communism on the
other, in the attempt to dispel the common misconception that identifies
liberism with non-interventionism. Since it had now become quite clear to
him that the difference between ‘‘liberist’’ and ‘‘interventionist’’ did not reside
in the quantity (for example, private property vs. public property) but rather
in the type of intervention by the state in the market, the problem now
became that of distinguishing among the different types of intervention.
In Einaudi’s view, whereas the ‘‘interventionist law-maker’’ proceeds
through command-rules or directives, i.e. by telling individuals what ‘‘they
must do and not do’’, the liberal-liberist law-maker says to the people: ‘‘I will
certainly not tell you what you must do, but I will fix the limits within which
you will be able to move freely, at your own risk’’.64 The distinction would
thus seem to lie between ‘‘command-rules’’ and ‘‘framework-rules’’, or be-
tween ‘‘specific command’’ and ‘‘general and abstract law’’, ‘‘arbitrary power’’
and ‘‘law’’, ‘‘administrative’’ and ‘‘juridical’’ action.65
While it may be true, as Bobbio pointed out, that there is a hint of an ana-
logy with the Hayekian distinction between rules of organization and rules of
conduct,66 it is nevertheless undeniable that Einaudi did not enquire into the
full philosophical-legal implications of these distinctions. In other words, in
Einaudi there is no clarification either of the meaning of the law-maker’s
act in ‘‘fixing the limits’’ or of the nature of this ‘‘limit’’, even though Einaudi
mentions it repeatedly, associating it with the notion of ‘‘condition’’ of possi-
bility. In actual fact, the distinction between ‘‘command’’ and ‘‘framework’’ is
labile because even the framework itself imposes some ‘‘constraints’’.67 More-
over, as already noted by Leoni, however general and abstract these con-
straints may be, they do not avert the eventuality that even the liberist law-
maker may end up telling men ‘‘what they must do’’. For instance, following
the examples adduced by Einaudi, ‘‘the liberist law-maker’’ who sets the limits
on free action, says:
63 L. EINAUDI, Memorandum, G. BERTA (ed.) (Venezia, Marsilio, 1994), pp. 45-46 (my italics).
64 ID., ‘‘Liberismo e comunismo’’ (1941), in Il buongoverno cit., pp. 273-274.
65 ID., Memorandum cit., p. 30.
66 N. BOBBIO, ‘‘Il pensiero politico di Luigi Einaudi’’ (1974), in L. EINAUDI, Memorandum cit.,
p. 94.
67 Cf. also ID., ‘‘Discorso elementare sulle somiglianze e sulle dissomiglianze fra liberalismo e
socialismo’’ (1957), in Prediche inutili cit., p. 220.
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If you are an industrialist, you will be able to freely choose your workers, but you
will not be allowed to keep them at work for more than such and such a number of
hours a day or night, and the number will vary depending on whether they are ado-
lescents, men or women; you will have to insure them against accidents in the work-
place, disability, old age, or illness. Your will have to make comfort rooms available
for breast-feeding women, and washing areas equipped with showers and water for
the workmen to get washed; you will have to abide by health and safety regulations
in the working areas68
and so forth. Surveying these examples, Leoni objected that it is
hard to understand why the liberist intervention should limit itself, say, to showers for
the workmen and not go so far as to include, one might suggest, play-school for the
workers’ children; or why it should go so far as to include the showers instead of lim-
iting itself to water or cleaning the various areas. In short, one is quite spontaneously
prompted to ask: where does the intervention called liberist begin, or indeed, where
does it end? And why should it be regarded as being of a different type compared to
the intervention known as socialist?69
However, on closer inspection, it could be said that Einaudi’s line of rea-
soning presupposes that the ‘‘duties’’ imposed by the liberist lawmaker will be
obeyed inasmuch as certain minimum prerequisites of dignity and hygiene in
the workplace have received prior recognition and have been commonly ac-
cepted. In this context, it is no coincidence that during the period of time
in question, while drafting an extensive review of Ro¨pke’s Die Gesellshaftskri-
sis der Gegenwart, Einaudi had begun to address the question of the limits
and condition of possibility of competitive struggle. Granting that the degen-
erations of capitalism were not to be attributed to ‘‘the economics of compe-
tition’’ but to ‘‘failure to observe the rules of the game of competition’’, he felt
it was nevertheless imperative to recognize the ‘‘crucial importance of an ethi-
cal-legal-institutional setting suited to the principles of the economy itself’’,
where the pride of place awarded to ‘‘ethical’’ would seem to suggest that
the ‘‘legal-institutional’’ aspect itself presupposes values.70
68 ID., Liberismo e comunismo cit., p. 274 (my italics).
69 B. LEONI, Conversazioni su Einaudi e Croce cit., p. 65 (my italics).
70 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico. La terza via fra i secoli XVIII e
XIX’’, Rivista di storia economica (June 1942), pp. 49-72. Note that Ro¨pke had not only grasped ‘‘the
vast programme of ‘good government’ to which Einaudi devoted the whole of his life’’ (see supra),
but he also reciprocated Einaudi’s admiration, to the point of considering him as one of the ‘‘leaders
of modern liberalism’’ (W. RO¨PKE, Scritti liberali, A. FRUMENTO (ed.), ital. transl. (Firenze, Sansoni,
1974), p. 114). On Einaudi and Ro¨pke, allow me again to refer the reader to P. SILVESTRI, Il liberali-
smo di Luigi Einaudi o del buongoverno cit., pp. 238-244; cf. most recently F. FORTE, ‘‘Einaudi e Ro¨p-
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Once again, Einaudi’s argument should be more carefully considered by set-
ting it in the context of the aim he was seeking to achieve, namely that of con-
futing the false identification between liberism and non interventionism. His
conclusion in this regard is instructive. The line of demarcation sought by Einau-
di did not so much concern the ‘‘framework/command’’ dichotomy, since both
the framework and the command, inasmuch as they are limits, must be freely
recognized in order to be obeyed. The decisive question thus becomes the ‘‘cri-
tical point’’, a theme introduced by Einaudi in this context and then developed
later (see section 4). Moreover, open and active participation in the public
sphere, critical debate and its publicity (rather than the framework-law per se)
plays an essential role in rendering any legislative measure ‘‘universal’’ and not
‘‘arbitrary’’, and therefore legitimate. In other words, the dread of command
laws stems not from the argument that they have a coercive ‘‘essence’’, but from
their potentially paternalistic impact, although it has to be admitted that not
even the general and abstract laws are exempt from such an eventuality. Patern-
alism is always an inbuilt feature of what Einaudi called the ‘‘short route’’ to
security, happiness and well-being. By contrast, the ‘‘long route’’ is necessarily
‘‘laborious and uncertain’’, and ‘‘it cannot be otherwise; because men have to
engage in experiments at their own risk [...]; because men do not improve when
someone takes it upon himself to decide, on their behalf and in their name, what
they must and must not do: rather, men must acquire their education by them-
selves and make themselves morally capable of taking decisions under their own
responsibility’’.71 Therefore, what is really at stake in the ‘doctrine’ of the ‘‘cri-
tical point’’, in the sense described here, is the twofold concept of freedom-
responsibility. ‘‘If I had to give a definition’’, Einaudi concluded,
I would say that any measure for greater social justice or statization that goes be-
yond the critical point is communistic, and any measure that wisely succeeds in re-
maining somewhat below it is liberal. This clearly shows that the crux of the dispute
[on liberism-liberalism vs. socialism-communism] does not reside in the measure it-
self but in the means which ensure it stays within the critical point limits or else make
it overstep these limits.72
Einaudi also focused attention on an identical problem of limits and their
recognition with regard to the founding values of the constitutional order. He
ke. Interventi conformi ed economia sociale di mercato’’ (2001), in L’economia liberale di L. Einaudi
cit., pp. 223-238.
71 L. EINAUDI, Liberismo e comunismo cit., p. 275.
72 Ibid., pp. 277-278.
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expounded his ideas in the substantial essay «Major et sanior pars» ossia della
tolleranza e dell’adesione politica (January 1945),73 written as he looked to-
wards the phase of the Constituent Assembly in Italy, of which he himself
was one of the most eminent protagonists. This essay was also one of the ways
in which, as an ‘old liberal’, he sought to come to terms with the nascent de-
mocratic order: if ‘‘the constitution of the modern states is founded on the
principle of the major pars, of the majority’’, nevertheless this principle, he ar-
gued, could not and was not to be considered its ultimate foundation. For our
purposes here, it is sufficient to highlight just a few of the problems addressed
by Einaudi.
First, it was important to avoid reducing legitimacy to the procedural
criterion of the major pars, and likewise to avoid reducing legitimacy to legality.
This was vital, Einaudi wrote, not only to limit the ‘‘abuse of power by the
majority over the minority, or because democracy can always degenerate into
‘‘demagogy’’, but also because a state of ‘‘tyranny’’ and corruption can per-
fectly easily take shape under the umbrella of ‘‘legality’’. Therefore the most
appropriate regulatory criterion to pursue is one where
if we use the term ‘democratic’ to designate a society whose government is intent on
achieving the greatest possible moral and material good of the men who today and
tomorrow are the components of the national community, then we can say that the
more the ‘majority’ – which is necessarily entrusted with choosing the select govern-
ing group – succeeds in identifying the elected with the sanior pars of the political
ruling class,
in other words with the ‘‘meliores’’, the ‘‘wise’’, the ‘‘prudent’’, the greater will
be the likelihood of fulfilling the aim of establishing a democratic society.
With regard to the regulatory criterion of the tendency towards identification
between the ruled and the rulers, in the liberal approach this was to be
brought about through the fundamental mediating function of the public
sphere. In contrast, the mechanism of checks and balances, important though
it was in containing the abuse of power or arbitrary power of the majority,
appeared to Einaudi as a second best, so much so that ‘‘checks’’ can fulfill
their function only ‘‘if the men [of the majority] are willing to be ‘‘tolerant’’,
that is to say only in the extent to which society lives in a climate of concord
supported by inalienable values, which are usually and historically recognized
as such in the wake of bloody battles, injustice and unspeakable suffering.
73 All the citations below are taken from L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Major et sanior pars ossia della tolleranza
e dell’adesione politica’’ (1945), in Il buongoverno cit., pp. 92-112.
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Now, Einaudi went on, over time these values crystallize into dogmas and
taboos internalized by common consciousness, and it is these dogmas and
taboos that operate as ‘‘invisible’’ limits on power.
An old English brocard – Einaudi explained – states that the House of Commons
can do anything save transform a man into a woman and viceversa. Like all brocards,
it is silent on the point that that there are many things law-makers could do, but do
not do because a mysterious invisible hand closes their mouth and prevents them from
uttering words different from those the centuries have engraved in men’s consciences.
Continuing in this same line of reasoning, and in a passage of Burkean
ascendancy,74 Einaudi writes that:
The checks are an extension of the will of dead men, who say to the men that are
alive today: you shall not operate as you please [...]; you shall, under pain of violating
solemn oaths and constitutional charters, observe certain rules that we held to be
essential for conservation of the state we founded. If you wish to change these rules,
you must first engage in prolonged reflection, you must obtain the consensus of the
greater part of your fellow-men, you will have to tolerate the circumstance that some
groups among them, the minority of them, will obstinately refuse to consent to the
change desired by the overwhelming proportion of citizens.
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the ‘‘legal checks writ-
ten into the constitution are rigid’’ and since ‘‘in moments of great political
tension, when men become intolerant’’ and there is an ‘‘urgent demand’’ for
‘‘reforms’’, ‘‘the lack of a safety valve can lead to a violent change of regime’’.
Given these circumstances, Einaudi maintains, it is only through the prudence
and the ‘‘sense of historical responsibility’’ of the ruling elite that a way out of
this type of ‘‘legally insoluble dilemma’’ can be found.
In short, it can be observed that the Einaudian approach calls for a two-
fold legitimation criterion: political, i.e. concerning the question of how those
who are ruled over can proceed to identify the good elite, and juridical, which
is to a large extent dependent on the criterion that regulates critical discussion
concerning both ordinary and constitutional laws. ‘‘An enduring, fertile law
has as its essential characteristic the support of the minority for the resolution
passed by the majority’’. But in order for this ‘‘support’’ to be authentic and
consciously expressed, and not merely the fruit of a compromise of do ut des,
it must necessarily undergo the stage of ‘‘criticism’’, ‘‘debate’’, ‘‘contrasting
74 An ascendancy noted by B. LEONI, Luigi Einaudi e la scienza del governo cit., p. 83.
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ideas’’, as it proceeds on the route that leads to the formation of laws. Only
through criticism and contrast can the law, which is ‘‘always formally coer-
cive’’, ‘‘become the common fruit of the majority and the minority’’; ‘‘only
then do the people say: this is the law. And only then do they obey it’’.
However, in Einaudi’s vision there is one more ‘‘final’’ level of legitimacy,
namely the foundational and invisible level (to use Einaudi’s own words). This
coincides with the myth and dogmas that act as the supporting structure for
the entire institutional and social order: these are by definition, albeit tem-
porarily, shielded from criticism. In the one and only essay where Einaudi
focuses directly and explicitly on the problem of legitimacy, he maintains that
stable ‘‘political society’’ are ‘‘built on the rock-solid base of juridically inde-
finable myth, and of some words whose meaning is probably impossible to
define, yet these myth and words embody the will of the past and the consensus
of the living’’. These myth are often condensed into a ‘‘formula that goes vir-
tually unnoticed [...] against which nobody raises any objection’’. Inasmuch as
they are a force of social cohesion, these formulas and/or rituals are ‘‘states of
mind’’ that constitute ‘‘the basis of legitimacy’’. This is how institutions come
to be accepted by the ‘‘future generations’’.75
Resuming the basic theme being developed in this article, we can thus as-
sert that these ‘‘myth’’ are figures of auctoritas (in Latin augere = to found, pro-
mote, endow with authenticity) from which springs power, and which form the
supporting structure of society. It is an auctoritas which precisely for this reason
cannot be reduced to a procedural, legalistic or technical-engineering config-
uration of power, such as the modern version of legal-rational power. From this
perspective, it is worth noticing that many current social sciences adopt, in my
view, a reductive conception of laws and institutions as mere ‘‘rules of the
game’’ meant as a set of constraints or opportunities, or the means for the pur-
suit of given aims. Such approaches neglect the problem of the internalisation
of institutions and of their normative authority, thus overlooking the anthropo-
logically more authentic meaning of ‘‘instituting’’ in the strict sense of instituere
[establishing (statuere) inside (in-)], but also of founding and educating. Insti-
tutions are far more than mere ‘‘rules of the game’’: they are mirrors of (indi-
vidual and collective) identity and they are endowed with a normative structure
that is much more profoundly rooted in feeling than in instrumental rationality.
Institutions are mediators between ‘‘inner life’’ and ‘‘public life’’, as connecting
structures and a medium of communication.
75 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Della paura’’ (1946), in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-1947
cit., pp. 223-226 (my italics).
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3.3. ‘‘Rule of truth’’
If the elected ruling class imagined by Einaudi was certainly not conceived
as the repository of truth concerning the common good,76 much less was it in
a position to impose such a good on the governed. In a final attempt to refor-
mulate the status of the public sphere, and, in particular, the fundamental role
of the press as a critical voice, Einaudi wrote: ‘‘truth is no person’s privilege
and arises only from open contrast among opposing opinions. Defense of the
common good is the privilege of no social group’’; therefore, since ‘‘the notion
of the common good, of the general interest’’ cannot be defined [...] we must
resign ourselves to listening with due respect to all the multifarious views
and obtaining the greatest possible harmony from that confused babble of
voices’’.77 Another significant aspect is that even the
power of the majorities encounters a limit in the truth of the resolution they have
adopted. [...] In a free society, the process of debate does not end with the majority
vote. [...] A law truly enters into the holy of holies and is inscribed in the bronze
tables of the law when [after prolonged debate] criticism falls silent. [...] Therefore
the most supreme legislative power in every free country, does not reside in parliament.
The latter is only one of the manifestations, the legal face, of power.
In this essay, what is significant is not only the fact of assuming ‘‘truth’’ as
the ‘‘limit’’ on power, but also the fact that Einaudi assigns to critical con-
science – in its specific manifestation as the press, which acts as the ‘‘mouth-
piece’’ of this conscience – the duty to speak in the name of a veritas which
here seems to assume a transcendental dimension. The newspaper, Einaudi
concludes, should become the ‘‘mouth of truths’’, of ‘‘eternal’’ truths, so that
it can give voice to ‘‘the conscience of man, who aspires to reach up to
God’’.78 Admittedly, this line of reasoning is more allusive than persuasive,
but it does testify to Einaudi’s persistent need to leave open that ‘third place’
in which the ‘rule of truth’ is decreed and freely recognized, and from which
legitimacy should issue. In the words he wrote as late 1957, ‘‘truth lives only
because it can be denied. Since we are free to deny it at any moment, we assert
the rule of truth [‘‘impero della verita`’’] every time’’.79
76 In this regard: ID., ‘‘Gian Giacomo Rousseau, le teorie della volonta` generale e del partito
guida e il compito degli universitari’’ (1956), in Prediche inutili cit., passim.
77 ID., ‘‘Tipi di giornali’’ (1946), in Riflessioni di un liberale sulla democrazia. 1943-1947 cit.,
p. 246.
78 Ibid., pp. 259-260.
79 L. EINAUDI, Gian Giacomo Rousseau, le teorie della volonta` generale e del partito guida e il
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4. IN A NUTSHELL: THE DOCTRINE OF THE ‘‘CRITICAL POINT’’
To clarify the elusive meaning of the ‘‘critical point’’, never formalized by
Einaudi himself, but constantly reformulated with examples and metaphors,
one can paraphrase his ‘definition’ of liberalism: the critical point is a doctrine
of limits. It expresses the need for a median point, a genuine golden mean, as
well as a ‘mediating figure’, in other words a figure capable of mediating the
oppositions and the different tension lines that emerge in the ‘moments of
crisis’ Einaudi had found himself facing during his prolonged reflection: security
versus struggle, conservation versus innovation, tradition versus criticism, so-
cial equilibrium versus dynamism, state intervention versus individual free-
dom. In its essence, the doctrine of the critical point lies at the core of that
‘‘sound, vibrant and vital society’’ Einaudi had alluded to in his debate with
Rossi, which he had subsequently addressed in greater detail in the essay-
review on Ro¨pke. In this sense, the ‘‘critical point’’ is a figure that synthesizes
the law-freedom nexus.80 Its most effective formulation is perhaps found in
the Lezioni di politica sociale [Lectures on Social Policy] (written during his
Swiss exile in 1943-44), when, with the rising concept of the welfare state, Ei-
naudi felt it was essential to consider the problem of the ‘demarcation line’
between the state and civil society. ‘‘The critical point marks the transition
from live men to automata’’.81 It is the point beyond which the intervention
of the state is transformed from physiological to pathological, and beyond
which the welfare state, as Einaudi often repeated, is turned into a society re-
duced to ‘‘panem et circenses’’. In this perspective, and in a final chapter on
compito degli universitari cit., p. 201. Here Einaudi warned against acritical acceptance of the many
‘‘formulas’’ which, over the curse of history, ‘‘from Robespierre to Babeuf, from Buonarroti to Saint-
Simon, from Fourier to Marx, from Mussolini to Hitler, from Lenin to Stalin’’, have claimed to
impose themselves as absolute truths: ‘‘virtue’’, ‘‘the religion of science’’, ‘‘the dominance of blood
and race’’, ‘‘dictatorship of the proletariat’’, and so forth. Thus Einaudi warned his young students,
to whom these comments were addressed, not to lose the awareness ‘‘of not knowing; our motto is
one and one alone: we do not know, but we seek, the truth; we are never sure of possessing it and we
will come back to seek it day by day, constantly unsatisfied and always spurred by curiosity’’.
80 For a different interpretation of the critical point: S. RICOSSA, ‘‘Sulla teoria del punto criti-
co’’, in Luigi Einaudi. Ricordi e testimonianze (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1983), pp. 67-73.
81 L. EINAUDI, Lezioni di politica sociale (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1949), p. 238. Therefore, Einaudi
explains, if we extend ‘‘the program’’ of state intervention ‘‘beyond its own sphere, which is the pub-
lic sphere, to include the sphere that is proper of the individual, the family, the social group, the
close-knit community, the voluntary association, the charitable educational foundation, all of which
are certainly coordinated and interdependent institutions but endowed with their own independent
life, their own will, then we will have overstepped the critical point. In this case we would be faced
not with a society of living men, but an aggregate of automata maneuvered by a center, by a higher
authority’’ (ibid.).
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The task of the market and how it can be oriented, Einaudi endeavored to re-
formulate once again his gradualist reformism.
We can and therefore we must ensure that the market makes use of its good abil-
ity to govern the production and distribution of wealth within certain limits, which
we consider to be right and just and conforming to our ideals of a society where
all men have the possibility of developing their abilities in the best possible manner,
and where, even if absolute equality cannot be reached – for this would be compa-
tible only with the kind of life in anthills and beehives, known in the world of men
as tyranny, dictatorship, totalitarian regimes – there exist no excessive inequalities
of wealth and income. Therefore we must establish good laws for ourselves, good in-
stitutions, create a good educational system open to and suited to the various human
capabilities, and create good habits and customs. We must therefore try to be men
with a developed sense of awareness, desirous of becoming enlightened and/or of
acquiring knowledge and education, and we must reach upwards, in a noble compe-
tition. The market, which is already a wondrous mechanism, capable of giving the
best results within the limits of existing institutions, customs and laws, will be able
to give even more wonderful results if we succeed in perfecting and reforming the
institutions, customs and laws of the framework within which the market lives,
in order to reach up to the highest ideals of life. We will succeed in doing so, if we truly
desire to.82
The most comprehensive essay in which Einaudi focuses on the ‘‘critical
point’’ as the hallmark of a genuine liberal society is In lode del profitto [In
Praise of Profit], written in 1956.83 This essay deserves to be extensively cited
because it offers a highly accomplished compendium of Einaudi’s liberalism
(or the liberalism of good government) as a ‘‘vision of the world’’ and ‘‘of life’’
which is ‘‘varied and plenteous’’, open to ‘‘the uncertain unknown where one
can glimpse and achieve a new and higher future’’.84 A socially stable society,
Einaudi wrote, ‘‘must seek to provide safeguards so that life offers security for
the overwhelming majority of men, who do not love and are incapable of tol-
erating uncertainty, who do not wish to run risks and would be at a loss as to
how to cope with them’’. Hence the importance of ‘‘public services’’ and
‘‘social insurances’’. This notwithstanding, he warned, all these proposals
can be implemented ‘‘at one condition: namely, that the critical point is not
82 Ibid., p. 36. For a very good account on Einaudi’s great equilibrium in keeping together free-
dom, market and social justice, see P.L. PORTA, ‘‘Liberta`, mercato, giustizia sociale’’, in Luigi Einau-
di: liberta` economica e coesione sociale, A. GIGLIOBIANCO (ed.) (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2010).
83 The following citations are taken from L. EINAUDI, In lode del profitto cit., pp. 171-193.
84 ID., Memorandum cit., p. 44.
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reached’’. But this critical point cannot be determined a priori, since the ‘‘optimal
proportion’’ between security and struggle (and the ‘‘risk’’ the latter brings with
it), between tradition and criticism, conservation and innovation, ‘‘can be
determined only by experience which is constantly renewed’’. In order to avoid
exceeding the critical point, ‘‘the men of the minority are necessary because the
economic, social, moral and intellectual mechanism of a vibrant and progressive
society is necessarily subject to risks; because life itself is change, it is continuous
variation, it is a succession of crises, of high and low points, continuous
transitions’’. It is important to recall that for Einaudi, in economic activity, in
private property and in the enterprise spirit, it was the very essence of freedom
that was at stake. In contrast to Croce’s point of view, Einaudi believed that
economic activity could not be reduced to the category of ‘‘Utile’’. This was,
fundamentally, the conviction that led Einaudian liberalism to set limits on state
interference for reasons that were first and foremost ‘moral’, rather than simply
involving considerations of the efficiency of the system. It therefore need come
as no surprise that in this context ‘‘profit’’ becomes a condition and a symbol of
a freedom evoking ‘‘man’s gaze [...] directed towards the new, and upwards’’. A
‘‘society without risks’’ is a society condemned to death or inevitably on its way
towards a ‘‘totalitarian’’ system. It is precisely for this reason that
the risk-related profits of entrepreneurs must continue to exist if the economic system
is to be elastic, capable of withstanding the jolts of the never-ending variations of
technical change and of industrial inventions; if, in other words, we wish human
society to undergo transformations and grow. Profit is the price that has to be paid in
order to allow thought to advance freely towards the conquest of truth, and in order
for innovators to have a chance to test their discoveries, for enterprising men to con-
stantly break down the frontier of the known, of the already experienced, and move to-
wards the unknown that is still open to the material and moral advancement of man.
5. ALLUSIVE (IN)CONCLUSION: THE FIGURE OF THE GOOD GOVERNMENT
Throughout his long years of reflection on the challenges of his era and
the fertile exchange of ideas with some of the illustrious scholars of the time,
Einaudi had reached the conclusion that the liberal doctrine of struggle,
which presupposes an ideal model of man and society and was thus to be re-
garded as a non-neutral doctrine, should on the one hand not be imposed,
but, at best, preached,85 and on the other, it should be subjected to limits,
85 In this regard, a position very similar to that of Einaudi is the point of view adopted by
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so that it could be widely recognized and accepted. If throughout his life Ei-
naudi remained faithful to his conviction of the fertility of struggle, as time
went by he nevertheless revised the two foci of good government in terms
of ‘‘ceaseless endeavouring and experimenting’’,86 operating both in ‘‘debate’’
and ‘‘action’’. These were the themes addressed in some of Einaudi’s last Pre-
diche inutili [Useless Preachings] (1955-1959), where struggle takes on the role
of no less than a method of freedom. ‘‘The method ‘of freedom’ – Einaudi
specified – is founded on the principle of trial and error’’. Those who apply
this method
recognize from the very start that they may fall into error and desire that others may
attempt to demonstrate the error and discover the proper way to truth [...] Freedom
exists as long as there exists the possibility of debate, and criticism. Trial and error, the
possibility of making an attempt and going wrong; the freedom of criticism and op-
position; these are the characteristics of free regimes.87
In sum,
the great merit of free governments as compared to tyrannical regimes is precisely the
fact that in a regime where freedom reins, debate and action proceed through the
method of trial and error. This is the emblem of the superiority of the methods of
freedom over those prevailing under tyranny. A tyrant is never racked by doubt: a
tyrant marches straight ahead on the chosen path; but the path leads the country
to disaster.88
Thus the liberal society whose advent Einaudi sought to promote ‘‘is
founded’’, in the last analysis – in other words, stands or collapses – on a two-
fold ‘‘recognition’’ which must be conceded ‘‘from the very start’’: recognition
of one’s fallibility and recognition of the desires and beliefs ‘‘of others’’. This
J.M. BUCHANAN, Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2005), in particular The Soul of Classical Liberalism, pp. 52-61.
86 L. EINAUDI, Discorso elementare sulle somiglianze e le dissomiglianze tra liberalismo e sociali-
smo cit., p. 241: ‘‘only through struggle, only through never-ending endeavors and experiments, only
through successes and failures can a society or a nation thrive. When struggle comes to an end, this
signals the death of society’’. Building on this argument, Marchionatti rightly defined Einaudi as a
‘‘theorist of the open society’’ (R. MARCHIONATTI, ‘‘Luigi Einaudi, economista e liberale’’, in Maestri
dell’Ateneo torinese dal Settecento al Novecento, R. ALLI`O (ed.) (Torino, Centro Studi di Storia del-
l’Universita` di Torino, 2004), pp. 61-84: 84).
87 L. EINAUDI, ‘‘Scuola e liberta`’’ (1956), in Prediche inutili cit., pp. 57-58 (my italics).
88 ID., ‘‘Che cosa rimarrebbe allo stato?’’ (1959), in Prediche inutili cit., pp. 345-346. I under-
lined the identity between Einaudi and Popper – probably mediated by the thought of J.S. Mill and
by Einaudi’s reading of J. TALMON, ‘‘The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy’’ (London, Secker &
Warburg, 1952) – in Il liberalismo di Luigi Einaudi o del buongoverno cit., pp. 62-63.
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in turn implies willingness to listen, and above all, willingness to change.89
However, in Einaudi’s eyes these limits were not restricted to the list of con-
straints deriving from human deficiencies or fallibility: rather, as we saw
above, they were also associated with the limits of the institutional framework
that ‘institutes’ and ‘guides’ human action.90 The ‘‘ideal city’’ of Einaudi’s as-
pirations, mid-way between heaven and earth, possibility and reality, is there-
fore a model which, while not claiming to be perfect,91 is perfectible, that is to
say, it proceeds by trial and error along the road to betterment and improve-
ment, and remains open to the emergence of the ‘‘new’’ and the ‘‘unknown’’.
Gazing up at the fresco by Ambrogio Lorenzetti on the Effects of Good
and Bad Government in the countryside and the city, and inserting a few of
its details into the collection entitled Good government (1954), Einaudi prob-
ably construed it as the ideal model of society that had so long formed the
object of his quest and his teachings. Pointing to the images of good govern-
ment, the then President of the Republic, at a distance of six centuries, seems
to repeat the same gesture as the rulers of Siena, who were determined to
make it visible, on the walls of the Palazzo pubblico [Civic Building, open
to the public], as an unequivocal founding reference of their (good) govern-
ment. By doing so, Einaudi indicated a medium in which and through which
the ruled and the rulers, public and private, could identify themselves. These
are the images on which he would have aspired to found his ‘‘liberal society’’.
This was one of the final stages of a journey studded with waystages and
countless fresh starts: from the divine city to the Periclean polis, from the
medieval cities ‘‘of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’’ to the ‘‘Italian
Risorgimento of Mazzini and Cavour’’.92 Perhaps this spasmodic motion,
proceeding by fits and starts, is symptomatic of an unsatisfied quest, an
endeavor repeatedly taken up again and never brought to a conclusion, along
the road that looked to good government as the ideal model of society.
In effect, Einaudi had referred to good government more in an allusive
manner than in theoretical-conceptual terms, although (as we will see shortly)
89 I would argue that the same interpretation can be given to the assertion that sees in Einaudi’s
liberalism as a veritable forma mentis: E. DI NUOSCIO, ‘‘Le libe´ralisme de Luigi Einaudi’’, in
L’histoire du libe´ralisme en Europe, P. NEMO – J. PETITOT (eds.) (Paris, Presses Universitaires de
France, 2006), pp. 651-672.
90 For a reflection on the institutional question cf. also R. CUBEDDU, Le istituzioni e la liberta`
(Macerata, Liberilibri, 2006), pp. 139-193.
91 For an anti-perfectionist economic philosophy cf. also S. RICOSSA, La fine dell’economia. Sag-
gio sulla perfezione (1986), preface by E. Colombatto (Soveria Mannelli - Treviglio, Rubbettino - Fac-
co, 2006).
92 L. EINAUDI, Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico cit., p. 72.
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this does not mean it cannot be granted the epistemological status of a theory.
If good government was never theorized nor, much less, systematized in a har-
monious and accomplished treatise, this is a mark of Einaudi’s authentically
liberal spirit. The contemporary relevance of the Piedmontese liberal resides
in the very circumstance that his thought cannot be reduced to his writings; it
does not constitute a logical-categorial, closed and perfect system. His attitude
of openness to comparison and exchange of ideas, to criticism and change, to
‘‘experience’’ and the ‘‘new’’, precluded that he could ever endorse such
closure. Paraphrasing a celebrated passage from Musil, one could say that
Einaudi’s marked ‘‘sense of reality’’ was combined with a no less radical
‘‘sense of possibility’’.93
I would like to clarify this point by dwelling on the philosophical-legal
perspective put forward by Enrico di Robilant concerning the epistemological
meaning of ‘‘making theory’’. By introducing the notion of figure, and making
reference to the aesthetic-perceptual component of theories, de Robilant under-
lines that theory ‘‘alludes to something which goes beyond its information
content’’. In this perspective,
the aesthetic force of theories should not be conceived as something alien to their ex-
planatory structure, for it is inextricably bound up with their structure; therefore it
can, implicitly, increase their capacity of representation, their reduction to unity
and explanation, inasmuch as it displays them in their structure and their internal
dynamics. Yet although the aesthetic force of theories stems from this structure and
this dynamic trend, its significance goes beyond the theories themselves, in that it alludes
to a meaning which cannot be reduced to their description or to information concern-
ing them. For analogously to the ‘meaning’ of a work of art, it can never be fully and
exhaustively put into words, but only conveyed by means of allusive indications.
In this sense theories contain
less of the reality that they propose to explain because they constitute a figure based
on a selection with a theoretical bias; yet on the other hand they contain more than
the reality that is explained, in that they are the bearers of an allusive meaning spring-
ing from their form and transcending the represented and explained reality.94
93 R. MUSIL, L’uomo senza qualita`, A. FRISE´ (ed.), ital. transl. (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1996), p. 13.
While the ‘concreteness’ of Einaudian thought has often been noted (among others, J.A. SCHUMP-
ETER, History of Economic Analysis (NY, Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 820, 855), it seems to
me that insufficient emphasis has been placed on this ‘ideal tension’.
94 E. DI ROBILANT, ‘‘La configurazione delle teorie nella scienza giuridica’’, Rivista internazio-
nale di filosofia del diritto, IV (1976), pp. 470-539: 536.
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This epistemological perspective, applied to the ‘juridical’ context, implies
that the law is ‘‘a set of theoretical figures that are present in this theoretical
form and which have to be translated into actual reality’’; the law is a ‘‘virtual
reality endowed with the inherent pretence of transforming itself into actual
reality’’.95 Now, it is precisely this gap between the virtual and the actual that
gives rise to normativity.96
By the same token, in order for ideal good government to become ‘real’
(while still holding the gap between these two registers open) – in order,
say, for it to be genuinely capable of setting a limit on the ‘‘omnipotence of
the state’’ but also on ‘‘private abuse and oppression’’,97 it must constitute
a widely shared axiological horizon. But this horizon, which is itself also
the figure of a limit, must in turn always remain open to the possibility of
change, even to the possibility of going beyond its own limit.
Similarly, and in a still more significant manner, the ideal good govern-
ment preached by Einaudi in the public sphere spans the overlapping be-
tween economic theory (as a ‘science of good government’) and narration, be-
tween rationality and identity. It is a constellation of metaphors, symbols,
emblematic figures, ranging from the myth of the self-made man to the sym-
bolic figure of the pater familias, from the ‘‘rule of law’’ to the ‘‘rule of truth’’,
from the ideal of the mixed government to the good elite that would be ex-
pected to arise from the ‘‘models of private life’’. Not to mention Einaudi
the narrator, Einaudi who narrated the ‘deeds of the heroes’, pointing to them
as models: the ‘‘wise’’, the ‘‘patriarchs’’, the ‘‘innovators’’, and the ‘‘crazy’’
‘‘builders of their own land’’, the ‘‘speculators’’, the ‘‘inventors’’, the ‘‘busy
bees’’, the ‘‘savers’’, whom he contrasted with the ‘‘egoists’’, the ‘‘envious’’,
the ‘‘slothful’’, the ‘‘wastrels’’, the ‘‘squanderers’’, the ‘‘lazy drones’’.98 In
sum, good government itself, through a process of continuous translation-re-
writing – from the good government the Pythia had promised Lycurgus to
95 ID., Diritto, societa` e persona. Appunti per il corso di filosofia del diritto 1998-99 (Torino,
Giappichelli, 1999), p. 32.
96 For further thoughts on this perspective, seen in terms of the relation between aesthetics and
normativity, cf. P. HERITER, Societa` post-hitleriane? cit., especially pp. 167 and ff.
97 In the solemn message read to the two houses of Parliament on 12th May 1948 after his elec-
tion to the office of President of the Republic, and addressed to young republican Italy, Einaudi
spelled out his reformist credo: ‘‘to retain of the present social structure all that which – and only
that which – is a guarantee of freedom of the human person against the omnipotence of the state
and against overweening private power, and to guarantee to all citizens, whatever the circumstances
of their birth may have been, the greatest possible equality of starting points’’.
98 Precisely for this reason I believe it is mistaken, and misleading, to summarize the complexity
of Einaudi’s figure under the illuminist label of ‘‘demythologizer’’ (R. ROMANO, ‘‘Introduzione’’, in
L. EINAUDI, Scritti economici storici e civili, R. ROMANO (ed.) (Milano, Mondadori, 1973), p. XLI).
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Lorenzetti’s fresco cycle, from the treatises on oikonomia up to the ‘good gov-
ernance’ of the present-day – is a great mythic symbol that is eternally reactua-
lized.
However, there is a need for awareness that every translation-rewriting
may always involve the risk of reducing good government to a legitimizing
slogan. Such a risk is inherent in that particular construal of good governance
where the insistence on governmental procedures (and on an instrumental
notion of rationality) seems to imply that the procedures are per se a guarantee
of that good, thereby exploiting the alleged value of efficient procedures to
mask the power politics going on behind the scenes.
In some respects, Einaudi’s good government cautions us on this account
as well. And this is not only because, as he warned, ‘‘every generation must
address the everlasting problem of how to preserve the ‘‘freedom of man’’:
it is also because the good government portrayed by Einaudi does not lend
itself to being reduced to efficiency or to the procedures involved in govern-
ment affairs, for the simple reason that the scientific, economic, political or
legal level of his line of reasoning is always overlaid with a mythic, symbolic,
metaphoric and narrative plane.
This is also why, in my view, Lorenzetti’s pictorial cycle (and Luigi Einau-
di’s reference to it) can be seen as far more anthropologically ‘complex’, open
and rich then the modern theories of governance and/or good governance. It
is because it depicts the problem of good government and bad government
with the different registers and ‘‘languages’’ of the human: theological, politi-
cal, juridical, economic, historical, architectural/city planning-related, sym-
bolic, allegorical, narrative, musical. As such, Lorenzetti’s fresco is an emble-
matic testimony to the complexity of the human. Thus the significance of this
fresco may be rethought by contemplating its anthropological implications: on
account of the possibility it embodies of developing into a structure that con-
nects, so that what becomes possible, always and only possible, is a meeting
among men. Moreover, and finally, this fresco does not claim to supply a de-
finitive answer to the problem of good government: rather, it continuously re-
proposes the mystery of its foundation. Like an inexhaustible resource of
meaningfulness it is everlastingly open to enquiry by man, by man who is for-
ever poised between good and bad government.
In conclusion, good government is philosophically interesting precisely in-
asmuch as it is a synthesizing-allusive theory-figure. Furthermore, as a figure,
model or image, good government institutes and inscribes a normativity in
whoever enters into a relation with it. Indeed, I would say that good govern-
ment is the most all-embracing figure of the law-freedom interplay. Good
— 96 —
PAOLO SILVESTRI
government is a meta-norm which, poised between ‘internal’ and ‘external’,
internalization and representation, ethos and law, remains open to change if
and in the extent to which man succeeds in maintaining open the gap between
heaven and earth, between possibility and reality (‘‘freedom exists as longs as
there exists the possibility of debate, criticism [...], the possibility of trying
and going wrong’’).
But, if one wishes to remain faithful to the ‘spirit’ of Einaudi rather than
the letter of his ‘law’, the conclusion cannot but be inconclusive. What I
might venture to add, with a ‘final’ variation, or rather with an Epilogue that
alludes to the Fugue, is that if the ‘‘critical point’’ represents a figure which is
a synthesis of the law-freedom nexus, then good government is a figure made
at image of that Foundation – construable as Authority, Law or Truth – which
can never be fully possessed, instituted, constituted, positivized. Only by vir-
tue of this consciousness is it the source of a superabundance of meaning
which is, as such, a guarantee of freedom.
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